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Cross-Border Venture Capital Investments: The Impact of Foreignness on Returns  
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Against the background of the growing internationalization of venture capital (VC) investing, 
this is the first global comparison of the returns generated by individual domestic and cross-
border deals.. We examine investments worldwide during 1971 to 2009 and find that cross-
border investments significantly underperform compared with equivalent domestic 
investments. Returns are negatively affected by geographic distances, cultural disparities and 
institutional differences between the home and host countries. Returns on cross-border and 
domestic deals also decline after the late 1990s. International portfolio diversification and the 
saturation of domestic markets may explain why VC investors make cross-border 
investments despite poor expected returns.  
JEL classification: G24, G32, G33, G34, G1. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the returns generated by venture capital (VC) investments in 
domestic and cross-border deals. Venture capital (VC) firms are specialized financial 
intermediaries which raise funds from investors. The VC firms then invest the funds in 
innovative new businesses, so-called portfolio companies, with a view to realising their 
investments after approximately 5±7 years (e.g. Sahlman 1990; Black and Gilson 1998; 
Gompers and Lerner 2004). In a domestic deal, a VC firm invests in its home country; in a 
cross-border deal, it invests outside its home country. VC firms are experts at investing in 
inherently risky and informationally opaque start-up ventures (e.g. Gorman and Sahlman 
1989; Gompers 1995; Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998). The high information asymmetries 
involved in such investments give rise to adverse selection prior to investment and agency 
conflicts post-investment. In order to limit these problems, VC firms closely screen potential 
investee companies; conduct careful due diligence; and align entrepreneurV¶ LQFHQWLYHVZLWK
firm value through monitoring, governance, contracts, and other mechanisms, including 
staged financing (e.g. Sahlman 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer 1994; Wright and Robbie 1998; 
Manigart and Wright 2013). By resolving information problems and incentive conflicts, and 
by providing portfolio companies with advice, expertise, and access to networks, VC 
investors are able to add value to their investments (e.g. Gorman and Sahlman 1989; 
Sapienza 1992; Sapienza, Manigart, and Vermeir 1996; Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart, and 
Paeleman 2013).  
The effectiveness of these specialized methods, mechanisms, and practices is often 
EHOLHYHGWRGHSHQGFUXFLDOO\RQ9&LQYHVWRUV¶IDPLOLDULW\ZLWK ORFDOPDUNHWV; their access to 
local information, knowledge, and networks; and the proximity between VC investors and 
their investee (portfolio) companies in order to maintain close links, frequent interaction, and 
valuable reputational capital (e.g. Cumming and Johan 2007; Chen, Gompers, Kovner, and 
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Lerner 2010; Dai, Jo, and Kassicieh 2012; Hain, Johan, and Wang 2015; Wuebker, Kraeussl, 
and Schulze 2016). As a result, VC investing has long been thought to be an inherently local 
business (Wright and Robbie 1998; Cumming and Dai 2010; Dai et al. 2012).  
In apparent defiance of this view, the two decades prior to the financial crisis of 2007 
saw a large increase in the number and size of cross-border VC investments. Aizenman and 
Kendall (2012) report an increase in worldwide cross-border VC investment deals from 15% 
of global deals in the early 1990s to over 40% in 2007. More recently, cross-border investing 
by US VC firms has risen sharply, with early-stage VC investments increasing from under 
10% to more than 30% of VC deals in 2013 (Wuebker et al. 2016). In this context, more than 
70% of VC deals in Asia are funded by foreign VC firms (Dai et al. 2012).  
Against this background of increasing VC internationalization, we examine the 
returns performance of cross-border and domestic VC investments. VC investors may require 
higher or lower returns from cross-border investments than from domestic investments. On 
the one hand, VC firms LQYHVWLQJ DEURDG DUH OLNHO\ WR HQFRXQWHU µOLDELOLWLHV RI IRUHLJQQHVV¶
due to geographic distances, cultural disparities, and institutional differences between VC 
investors and their portfolio companies (Zaheer 1995; Wright, Pruthi, and Lockett 2005; Sojli 
and Tham 2017; Taussig 2017; Wu and Salomon 2017). As a result, cross-border investing 
gives rise to higher transaction costs (e.g. Portes and Rey 2005) and greater costs due to more 
severe information asymmetries and agency conflicts (Wright and Robbie 1998; Wuebker et 
al. 2016). In this case, VC investors require higher returns from cross-border investments to 
compensate for the additional costs. On the other hand, cross-border investing facilitates 
portfolio diversification; thus, VC investors with portfolios predominantly invested in 
domestic ventures may accept lower returns from cross-border investments (e.g. Poterba and 
French 1991). High levels of VC funds chasing limited numbers of promising investment 
opportunities may also drive VC investors to resort to cross-border investing, even though 
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they expect these investments to generate relatively low returns (Gompers and Lerner 2000). 
In a previous study of cross-border returns, Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher (2009) 
find that Asian-Pacific VC firms investing in US-based portfolio companies experience 
returns that are lower than their domestic investments. Cumming et al. (2009) use hand-
collected and largely proprietary data to assess the performance of 468 individual investments 
by VC firms in 12 Asian countries during 1989±2001 based on each investment¶s internal 
rate of return (IRR).  
While Cumming et al. (2009) are able to calculate investment returns due to their 
access to proprietary data, most other previous VC studies lack sufficiently detailed deal-
level data to compute direct measures of performance such as IRR or public market 
equivalent (PME) for individual investments. Because of data limitations, most studies 
measure performance in terms of the likelihood of successful VC exit (e.g. Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007) rather than IRR or PME. Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) explicitly note 
the use of exit success as a limitation of their analysis.1 Devigne, Manigart, and Wright 
(2016) highlight that the existing evidence on VC returns at deal level is limited and call for 
further research in order to understand the variation of returns. We are able to overcome this 
limitation by using detailed cash-flow data on individual VC investments obtained from the 
Centre of Private Equity Research (CEPRES) to calculate actual returns on individual VC 
investments.2 Our study contributes to the literature by comparing the returns of individual 
domestic and cross-border VC investments using a sample of 6,529 domestic and cross-
border VC deals made worldwide during 1971±2009. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to find that the underperformance of cross-border investments relative to 
                                                             
1
 With respect to their analysis of exit as a measure of VC success, Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) point out that an 
µimportant caveat for this part of our analysis is that we equate the investment outcome with the company's exit 
mode due to data limitations. This outcome variable is a coarse measure of investment performance, though it is 
commonly used in the entrepreneurship literature¶ (p. 340; italics added). 
2
 While previous studies have used CEPRES (e.g., Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou 2012, Krohmer, Lauterbach, 
and Calanog 2009, Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz 2010, Cumming and Walz 2010), none of these previous 
studies compare the returns of domestic and cross-border investments . 
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equivalent domestic investments is a global and persistent phenomenon. We base this 
conclusion on our analysis of the returns and other performance measures of a broad global 
sample of VC investments, comprising large numbers of home and destination countries and 
spanning more than three decades.  
Our results show that cross-border deals generate lower returns than equivalent 
domestic deals in terms of return-based performance. We address differences in the targeted 
selection and risk of VC investors and conclude that the observed return differentials amount 
to cross-border underperformance. We find that geographic distances, cultural disparities, and 
institutional differences between the home countries of VC investors and portfolio companies 
negatively affect cross-border returns. Additional tests show that VC firms benefit from 
cross-border investing by achieving portfolio diversification and overcoming shortages of 
domestic investment opportunities in saturated markets. Diversification, and the saturation of 
domestic markets, may explain why VC investors are attracted to cross-border investing 
despite the poor returns performance of cross-border deals.  
Our study helps to resolve conflicting evidence in prior studies which examine the 
effect of geographic distances between US VC investors and portfolio companies on VC exit 
performance (Chen et al. 2010; Cumming and Dai 2010; Bengtsson and Hsu 2015). For 
example, Chen et al. (2010) report that non-local deals outperform local deals in terms of 
initial public offering (IPO) exit probabilities, while Cumming and Dai (2010) find that local 
exit deals outperform non-local deals. Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) focus on the ethnicity of 
VC investors and founders of entrepreneurial companies and find that while shared ethnicity 
increases the likelihood of investment, it reduces exit performance. We explore what happens 
when VC investments cross borders and examine the impact of geographic distances, cultural 
disparities, and institutional differences in a similar way to the studies of Nahata, Hazarika, 
and Tandon (2014) and Dai and Nahata (2016). Like other cross-border performance studies, 
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Nahata et al. (2014) and Dai and Nahata (2016) measure performance purely in terms of IPO 
exit probabilities.  
Our study lies at the intersection of the literature of several academic fields including 
economics, finance, entrepreneurship, management, and international business, as outlined in 
section 2. Focusing largely on entrepreneurial finance, our study contributes to the growing 
literature on the internationalization of VC and private equity (PE) investment and on cross-
border VC/PE activity and flow (e.g. Schertler and Tykvová 2011; Tykvová and Schertler 
2011; Schertler and Tykvová 2012; Dai et al. 2012; Li and Zahra 2012; Cao, Cumming, Qian, 
and Wang 2015). It also contributes to the literature on the performance of cross-border VC 
investments in terms of the ability of VC investors to achieve successful exits (e.g. Wang and 
Wang 2012; Humphery-Jenner and Suchard 2013; Bertoni and Groh 2014; Nahata et al. 
2014; Cumming, Knill, and Syvrud 2016; Dai and Nahata 2016). In the context of this 
literature, our study builds on the existing research about the ways in which exit performance 
is affected by geographic distances, cultural/ethnic disparities, and institutional differences 
between the locations of US VC providers and those of their portfolio companies (Chen et al. 
2010; Cumming and Dai 2010; Bengtsson and Hsu 2015) and between the locations of 
international VC providers and their portfolio companies (Nahata et al. 2014; Dai and Nahata 
2016). Our study is also related to the literature on syndication and networks in cross-border 
investments (Hursti and Maula 2007; Guler and Guillén 2010; Meuleman and Wright 2011; 
Jääskeläinen and Maula 2014; Reuer and Ragozzino 2014;  Hain et al. 2015; Chemmanur, 
Hull, and Krishnan 2016; Meuleman, Jääskeläinen, Maula, and Wright 2017).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology, and section 4 
presents our analysis and results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2.  Literature, Conceptual Framework, and Hypotheses 
VC firms are experts at bearing risk and dealing with the information and agency 
problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) which complicate investments in promising, 
young entrepreneurial businesses characterized by high information asymmetries, high risk, 
and high potential (e.g. Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Gompers 1995; Amit et al.). Such 
ventures typically have little or no trading records or other information, such as balance 
sheets and past cash flow data, which are used in traditional valuation methods. Moreover, 
these ventures frequently operate in innovative industries with no established benchmark 
companies. VC firms have developed methods to limit the information and agency problems 
arising from such investments. Such methods include screening, due diligence, contracting, 
monitoring, governance, and staged financing (e.g. Sahlman 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer 
1994; Wright and Robbie 1998; Manigart and Wright 2013).  
The effectiveness of these specialized methods, mechanisms, and practices is often 
EHOLHYHGWRGHSHQGFUXFLDOO\RQ9&LQYHVWRUV¶IDPLOLDULW\ZLWK ORFDOPDUNHWV; their access to 
local information, knowledge, and networks; and the proximity between VC investors and 
their investee (portfolio) companies in order to maintain close links, frequent interaction, and 
valuable reputational capital (e.g. Cumming and Johan 2007; Chen et al. 2010; Dai et al. 
2012; Hain et al. 2015; Wuebker et al. 2016). Significant distances between VC firms and 
portfolio companies are likely to increase information asymmetries between investors and 
investees, causing more pronounced adverse selection and moral hazard (e.g. Dai et al. 2012; 
De Prijcker, Manigart, Wright, and De Maeseneire 2012; Hain et al. 2015; Dai and Nahata 
2016). Distance may thus increase the costs to VC firms of identifying and screening suitable 
investment opportunities (Cumming and Dai 2010; Wuebker et al. 2016). VC firms typically 
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conduct due diligence which is more rigorous, and hence, costlier for remote ventures 
(Nahata et al. 2014). In this regard, Wright, Lockett, and Pruthi (2005) report significant 
differences in the risk assessments and information sources which are used in targeted 
selection between foreign and domestic investors.  
Non-local and cross-border investors are at a disadvantage relative to local investors 
in terms of access to portfolio companies, local information, networks, reputational capital, 
and resources, and typically incur higher information and transaction costs (Nahata et al. 
2014). The higher costs of contracting and monitoring cross-border portfolio companies 
result in lower firm value and lower value added (Sapienza et al. 1996; Sorensen and Stuart 
2001; Dai et al. 2012; Wuebker et al. 2016). Mäkelä and Maula (2008) confirm that local VC 
ILUPV DUH PRUH NQRZOHGJHDEOH DERXW SRUWIROLR FRPSDQLHV¶ PDUNHWV WKDQ IRUHLJQ 9& ILUPV
The general partners of VC firms provide advice and monitoring to portfolio companies 
GXULQJPHHWLQJVKHOGDWWKHFRPSDQLHV¶RIILFHV; in this context, geographic distance increases 
the costs and the amount of time involved for the partners (Hain et al. 2015). Chemmanur et 
al. (2016) find that the absence of (geographic) proximity makes it more difficult for VC 
firms to move scarce human capital, such as skilled general partners of VC firms, to a 
portfolio company¶VORFDWLRQ. As a result, it is costlier to screen, monitor, advise, and support 
more distant portfolio companies.  
This advantage of local investors and investments is the focus of several studies from 
a range of academic disciplines including entrepreneurial and corporate finance, economics, 
and international business. Studies in international business and management, based on the 
VHPLQDOVWXG\E\=DKHHUUHIHUWRWKHGLVDGYDQWDJHRIQRWEHLQJORFDODVWKHµOLDELOLW\
RIIRUHLJQQHVV¶6WXGLHVLQDVVHWSULFLQJDQGFRUSRUDWHILQDQFHUHIHUWRLQYHVWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV
for more familiar local rather than non-ORFDOLQYHVWPHQWVDVµKRPHELDV¶3RWHUEDDQG)UHQFK
1991; Coval and Moskowitz 1999). Other studies show that VC firms investing abroad 
 9 
HQFRXQWHUWKHµOLDELOLW\RI IRUHLJQQHVV¶SUREOHP:ULJKW et al. 2005; Nahata et al. 2014; Dai 
and Nahata 2016). 
In order to compensate for the higher costs of cross-border investing as a result of the 
liability of foreignness, VC firms are likely to require higher returns from cross-border 
investments than from equivalent domestic investments. However, cross-border investing 
facilitates portfolio diversification; thus, VC investors with portfolios predominantly invested 
in domestic ventures may accept lower returns from cross-border investments (e.g. Poterba 
and French 1991). A lack of promising investment opportunities in their home countries, or 
rigorous competition for attractive deals because of excess funds available to VC investors, 
may also motivate VC firms to embark on cross-border ventures even if they expect them to 
generate relatively low returns (Gompers and Lerner 2000). With regard to 53 VC funds 
based in 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Cumming et al. (2009) find that these funds 
achieve lower internal rates of return (IRR) for investments in US portfolio companies than 
for domestic investments. At a global level, whether VC investors require higher or lower 
returns from cross-border investments than from domestic investments remains a question to 
be resolved empirically. 
Comparisons of the performance of VC firms show that tKH ILUPV¶selection criteria 
and investment behaviour may also differ between home and cross-border investments. 
Empirical evidence confirms that VC investors select different types of venture at home and 
abroad. The results of Dai et al. (2012) suggest that VC investors mitigate the higher 
information and monitoring costs of investing abroad by investing in later financing rounds 
and in larger, more mature companies which are more transparent and less costly to screen 
and monitor. VC investors also self-select cross-border investments. Cumming and Dai 
(2010) find that investments in more distant firms tend to be undertaken by more reputable 
and experienced VC investors acting in syndicates in order to spread the risk. Thus, when 
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comparing the returns generated by domestic and cross-border investments, it is essential to 
control for targeted selection and VC self-selection in order to compare equivalent domestic 
and cross-border investments. 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we formulate our first testable hypothesis as 
follows. 
H1: All else being equal, there is no difference in performance between domestic and 
cross-border VC investments.  
We measure absolute returns in terms of IRR and also measure the returns relative to 
a market benchmark in the form of PME. In addition to returns, we also examine exit 
performance. To the best of our knowledge, all prior studies of non-local and cross-border 
VC investments measure performance in terms of exit success. Following Giot and 
Schwienbacher (2007), they evaluate performance on the basis of whether and how quickly 
VC investors successfully exit their investments. Existing evidence on the exit performance 
of investments by US VC firms in local and non-local US portfolio companies is mixed 
(Chen et al. 2010; Cumming and Dai 2010; Bengtsson and Hsu 2015). While Chen et al. 
(2010) find that non-local deals of US VC firms outperform local deals in terms of their IPO 
exit probabilities, Cumming and Dai (2010) discover that local exit deals outperform non-
local deals. Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) focus on the ethnicities of VC investors and founders 
of entrepreneurial companies and find that shared ethnicity increases the likelihood of 
investment but reduces exit performance. Our analysis of VC investments across borders is 
closely related to Dai et al. (2012), Li, Vertinsky, and Li (2014), Nahata et al. (2014), and Dai 
and Nahata (2016).  
It is possible that foreign VC firms are less committed to their portfolio companies 
than local VC firms and may withdraw more quickly when a portfolio company¶V 
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performance is disappointing. In this regard, 9&ILUPV¶SUHPDWXUHH[LWs may damage portfolio 
companies (Mäkelä and Maula 2008). Alternatively, their lower levels of commitment and 
local embeddedness may enable foreign VC firms to make more efficient exit decisions 
(Devigne et al. 2016). Whatever the circumstances, exit decisions may have implications for 
UHWXUQVIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV¶SUHPDWXUHH[LWs may result in reduced returns, while more efficient 
exit decisions may lead to increased returns for cross-border investments. Longer periods of 
investment in portfolio companies not only cause higher monitoring costs but also liquidity 
problems for VC backers. If cross-border investments require greater effort and money spent 
on advising and monitoring portfolio companies, the higher costs of carrying cross-border 
investments relative to domestic investments may tip the balance in favour of earlier exits 
from cross-border investments (Cumming and Johan 2007; Espenlaub, Khurshed, and 
Mohamed 2015).  
In the final part of our analysis, we explore possible reasons why the returns of 
domestic and cross-border investments differ. In hypothesis 1, we focus on a binary 
definition of foreignness. Now, we examine the impacts of geographic distances, cultural 
disparities, and institutional differences. Studies show that geographic distances, cultural 
disparities, and institutional differences between home and host countries affect the exit 
performance of VC cross-border investments (Mäkelä and Maula 2008; Guler and Guillén 
2010; Li et al. 2014; Nahata et al. 2014; Dai and Nahata 2016). Evidence from the literature 
suggests that geographic distances and institutional differences have a negative impact on exit 
performance while the direction of the impact of cultural disparities is mixed. Our study 
contributes to this literature by examining the impact of geographic distances, cultural 
disparities, and institutional differences on returns rather than on exit success.  
First, we explore whether there is a difference between investments across a single, 
shared land border and investments across multiple borders. Investments across a single land 
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border may involve less costly travel. Chemmanur et al. (2016) find that greater travel time 
adversely affects the exit success of cross-border VC investments. However, travel costs may 
depend to a greater extent on geographic distance; thus, in the next step, we examine the 
impact of geographic distance. Prior studies show mixed results with some reporting that 
greater geographic distance reduces exit performance (Cumming and Dai 2010) while others 
report a positive effect (Chen et al. 2010) or no significant effect after controlling for other 
measures of distance (Li et al. 2014; Dai and Nahata 2016). Consequently, we formulate the 
following hypothesis.  
H2a: A VC firm¶V performance in cross-border deals is unrelated to the geographic 
distance between the home countries of the VC firm and its portfolio company (after 
controlling for other measures of distance). 
Because of colonial linkages, geographically distant countries may share similar 
languages, cultures, and institutions. However, because of historical accidents and conflicts, 
nearby or neighbouring countries may differ greatly not just in terms of their languages but 
also their cultures and institutional frameworks. Consequently, because geographic distances 
may not adequately capture the liability of foreignness, we also examine cultural disparit ies 
and institutional differences, following Li et al. (2014), Nahata et al. (2014), and Dai and 
1DKDWD  9& LQYHVWRUV¶ ODFN RI DZDUHQHVV RI ORFDO FXOWXUDO DQG VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV LQ
unfamiliar cross-border environments can be a source of conflict between a VC firm and its 
portfolio company, thereby increasing agency costs and reducing VC performance (Nahata et 
al. 2014). Cultural disparities and institutional differences can adversely affect levels of trust, 
reputation, financial contracting, and company performance (Li et al. 2014; Nahata et al. 
2014). Cultural disparity is commonly measured using Kogut and Singh¶V (1988) approach, 
based on the cultural measures (power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty 
avoidance) developed by Hofstede (1980). This approach is also used by Li et al. (2014), 
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Nahata et al. (2014), Hain et al. (2015), and Dai and Nahata (2016), among others. Li et al. 
(2014) find that cultural disparity reduces exit success, while Nahata et al. (2014) report that 
greater cultural disparity increases exit success. Nahata et al. (2014) argue that greater 
cultural disparity motivates VC investors to engage in closer pre-investment due diligence 
and screening; this in turn increases exit success. Focusing on the impact of cultural disparity 
on returns performance (as opposed to exit success), we test the following hypothesis. 
H2b: A VC firm¶V performance in cross-border deals is negatively related to the 
greater cultural disparity between the home countries of the VC firm and its portfolio 
company. 
VC investors encounter greater unfamiliarity and liability of foreignness in countries 
with institutional frameworks which differ from those in their home country. In a different 
institutional environment, a 9&ILUP¶V IDPLOLDUSUDFWLFHVDUH OLNHO\ WREHDWRGGVZLWK ORFDO
institutionalized practices with regard to deal selection, contracting, monitoring, and advising 
(Li et al. 2014). For example, VC firms from countries with strict and well-enforced legal 
rules and regulations rely on financial and accounting information to evaluate proposals and 
assess investment risk. However, in countries with weak institutional environments, VC firms 
must depend instead on personal contacts in order to access relevant information and enforce 
agreements (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Cumming, Fleming, and 
Schwienbacher 2006; Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz 2010; Li et al. 2014). VC firms which 
are used to the effective legal protection of investors and contract enforcement in their home 
countries find they can no longer employ complex, state-contingent contracts in host 
countries with weak legal institutions (Guler and Guillén 2010). In this regard, Chemmanur et 
al. (2016) examine the impact of legal systems on exit success but find no significant impact. 
Measuring institutional differences using the World Governance Index, Li et al. (2014) find 
that such differences significantly reduce VC exit success. We examine the impact on VC 
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cross-border returns of three dimensions of institutional difference: the difference in the legal 
systems of home and host countries (based on La Porta et al. 1998, similar to Chemmanur et 
al. 2016), and differences in regulatory quality and political stability (similar to Li et al. 
2014). Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis. 
H2c: A VC firm¶V performance in cross-border deals is negatively related to 
pronounced institutional differences between the home countries of the VC firm and its 
portfolio company. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data sources and sample  
Our data on individual VC investments are obtained from the Centre of Private Equity 
Research (CEPRES).3 CEPRES and its data are described in detail in Franzoni, Nowak, and 
Phalippou (2012). CEPRES data are used in a number of studies, including those of Krohmer, 
Lauterbach, and Calanog (2009), Cumming et al. (2010), Cumming and Walz (2010), and 
Franzoni et al. (2012). 
Through their special data-collection method (based on the so-called µ3ULYDWH(TXLW\
AnalysHU¶CEPRES effectively anonymizes all information relating to investments in order 
to meet the confidentiality requirements of the VC and PE firms which provide data to 
CEPRES. This technique means that no third parties are able to identify the performance of 
individual firms, funds, or managers. The importance of such anonymity is that it eliminates 
the incentives for VC and PE firms to overstate the results which they report to CEPRES. The 
                                                             
3
 CEPRES is a private data provider established in 2001 which offers information on VC deals worldwide.  
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lack of anonymity in other databases may result in overstating and backfilling information, a 
situation which amounts to positive self-reporting bias.  
Another important advantage of the CEPRES database is the availability of detailed 
information on cash flow at the level of individual VC investments. Other databases either 
lack this information or provide cash flow or IRR data only at the fund level.  
We start with all 14,224 observations in CEPRES for VC investments made from 
January 1971 to December 2009. We exclude 2,484 partial exits and non-exits and 5,057 
buyout investments.4 Of the remaining 6,683 observations, we have insufficient cash flow 
data for 154 deals. This leaves us with 6,529 observations on fully realized VC investments 
exited through IPOs, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), or liquidations (write-offs). We split 
our sample into four geographic regions in accordance with the locations of the VC investors: 
North America, Europe (excluding the UK), the UK, and the rest of the world (ROW). Our 
sample comprises 4,334 observations for North America, 839 for Europe, 363 for the UK, 
and 993 for the ROW.5 We classify investments as domestic (cross-border) if a VC firm and 
its portfolio company are located in the same country (different countries).6 
3.2. Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the methodology used in our analysis. In order to measure 
the financial returns of VC investments, we calculate IRR based on all cash flow to VC 
investors (both outflow and inflow). This cash flow is reported in the CEPRES database. 
Except for a few studies which use proprietary data (e.g. Cumming et al. 2009), most Prior 
                                                             
4
 We focus on fully exited (realized) deals to avoid issues related to the accuracy of the estimated net asset 
values (NAVs) of unrealized deals or timing issues about when the NAVs are reported. We examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of partial exits and non-exits in the robustness section. 
5
 Appendix A provides a breakdown of the distribution of VC deals by region during 1971 to 2009. 
6
 We observe the countries of origin of VC firms and portfolio companies at the time of the investments. A 
limitation of our data is that we do not observe relocations to other countries by either the VC firms or the 
portfolio companies after the initial investments. 
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research is limited to observing IRR at the fund level. Because we have access to cash flow 
data, we are able to calculate IRR based on actual (not proxied) cash flow at the level of 
individual VC investments. 7  The cash flow is converted into US dollars, following the 
approach adopted by Franzoni et al. (2012). Cash flow is not adjusted for management fees, 
interest, or carried interest. VC firms commonly use IRR to evaluate their investments in-
house and are often reluctant to disclose IRR figures. Moreover, if the firms do disclose their 
IRR figures, they have incentives to overstate them. As a result, reliable IRR data at the level 
of individual VC investments were not previously available to researchers. Some studies are 
able to calculate IRR but only at the level of an overall VC fund (rather than at the level of 
individual investments held within a fund, as we do here). However, an understanding of 
investment level returns is crucial for VC firms so that they can allocate capital efficiently 
between domestic and cross-border investments and for VC fund investors so that they can 
select appropriate funds. 
We observe the stream of cash flow between the start date of each investment and the 
final liquidation (exit) date. We then calculate the IRR as the discount rate which equates the 
present value of the net cash flow to zero. The cash flow consists of investments in portfolio 
companies, dividend repayments, and proceeds from exiting the investments.8 
In addition to IRR, our analysis uses PME. IRR is an absolute measure of 
performance in the sense that it is not measured relative to a benchmark. In contrast, PME is 
a relative performance measure which compares a VC investment to an equivalently timed 
investment in the relevant public market. PME has been interpreted as a market-adjusted 
multiple of invested capital in that a PME greater than one means that investors in a given 
VC deal gain more wealth than they would have achieved if they had invested in the public 
                                                             
7
 Note that the IRR estimated in our analysis are gross returns as opposed to returns net of fees and the costs 
(transaction, search, and monitoring) incurred by VC firms when undertaking and managing investments. 
8
 In our analyses, we winsorize IRR at 1%. 
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markets. We calculate PME as the ratio of discounted cash inflow to discounted cash outflow, 
where the discount rate is the total return in the corresponding stock market. For investments 
in US portfolio companies, we use the S&P 500 index to act as a proxy for the public market, 
as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005). For investments outside the US, we use the corresponding 
local stock market index. Sorensen and Jagannathan (2015) present rigorous economic 
underpinnings for PME and show that PME is equivalent to measuring performance using 
Rubinstein¶V (1976) dynamic version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The authors 
show that under reasonable assumptions about investor utility, PME is robust and valid 
regardless of the beta of an investment, even when the beta is time varying. They conclude 
that with µPME, investors can evaluate risk-adjusted performance without explicitly 
calculating any betas or even knowing the risk of the underlying investments¶ (Sorensen and 
Jagannathan 2015, p. 44). Hence, we interpret PME as a risk-adjusted measure of 
performance.  
In our initial multivariate analysis, we regress VC performance on whether or not a 
portfolio company is domestic or cross-border. Subsequent analyses relate VC 
performance to measures of distance between a VC firm and a portfolio company. VC 
performance (the dependent variable) is measured as either IRR or PME. In order to 
account for the endogeneity of the cross-border indicator arising from an (un)observable 
GLIIHUHQFHLQ9&EDFNHUV¶VHOHFWLRQFULWHULDDQGLQYHVWPHQWEHKDYLRXUDWKRPHDQGDEURDG
we estimate a two-stage Heckman model. At the first stage, we estimate a probit model of 
the probability of an investment being cross-border with the cross-border indicator (coded 
one for a cross-border investment and zero otherwise) as the dependent variable. The 
instrument used at the first stage is the capital inflow into the VC industry of the VC 
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SURYLGHU¶V KRPHFRXQWU\ LQ WKH \HDURI WKH LQYHVWPHQW9 At the second stage, we estimate 
VC performance by including the inverse Mills ratio based on the estimates of the first 
stage among the control (explanatory) variables. The explanatory variable of interest is the 
cross-border indicator. As control variables, we include deal and VC characteristics such 
as VC experience, investment size, fund age, and indicators of syndication, the financing 
stage, the industry of the portfolio company, and the year of investment (the deal year).10 
We also control for country-specific stock market liquidity (based on the portfolio 
FRPSDQ\¶V country of origin) in the year prior to VC exit. Further, we use bootstrapped 
standard errors. In addition to the two-stage model, we estimate mixed-effects models 
based on Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2005) which control for observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity, including differences between domestic and cross-border 
investments, and for the impact of outliers.  
In our initial analysis, we use a binary indicator which captures whether a portfolio 
company is domestic or cross-border. In a subsequent analysis, we examine an additional 
binary indicator (cross-border not sharing border) to differentiate between neighbouring 
countries and foreign countries without shared borders. In the final part of our analysis, we 
investigate whether distance between a VC firm and a portfolio company affects performance. 
We use three different measures of distance relating to geographic distances, cultural 
disparities, and institutional differences between countries of VC firms and portfolio 
companies. Geographic distances between VC firms and portfolio companies are measured as 
the physical distances between the capitals of the respective home countries. As in Dai and 
Nahata (2016), we quantify cultural disparities between the countries of VC firms and 
                                                             
9
 We expect that aggregate capital inflow into the VC industry of a given country make it more likely that VC 
firms invest abroad as competition among VC firms for domestic investments becomes more intense. This 
causes VC firms to search out investment opportunities abroad.  
10
 The CEPRES database we use only shows whether an investment is syndicated or not. Unfortunately, we 
cannot distinguish between domestic and foreign syndication. 
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portfolio companies using the four cultural dimensions of Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 
(2010), who follow the approach of Kogut and Singh (1988).11 The four dimensions relate to 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. The Hofstede et al.'s 
(2010) framework is the most widely used and recognized framework for measuring cultural 
disparities in different disciplines, including international business and management research 
(Sivakumar and Nakata 2001; Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson 2006). We obtain data from Geert 
+RIVWHGH¶V ZHEVLWH ZZZJHHUWKRIVWHGHQO and use the Cartesian distance measure to 
calculate culture disparity (see Appendix B for details of this measure). We use three 
measures of institutional differences between the home countries of VC firms and portfolio 
companies: differences in the regulatory quality, political stability, and the legal systems. 
Appendix B provides details of data sources and definitions of the variables. All variables are 
from CEPRES except for those representing market liquidity, differences in regulatory 
quality, and differences in political stability, which are collected from the World Bank online 
database, and the variable representing differences in legal systems, which is based on data 
FROOHFWHGIURP5DIDHO/D3RUWD¶VZHEVLWH 
In order to examine the effect of explanatory variables on the time from a VC 
investment to the VC exit or, more accurately, on the exit hazard rate defined as the inverse of 
the time to exit, we estimate the Cox proportional hazard model. The hazard function 
measures the likelihood of a VC firm to exit its investment within a small time interval, 
conditional on VC and market characteristics. The interesting feature of the Cox proportional 
hazard model is that it does not require any distributional assumptions about the exit rate. The 
coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model are estimated through maximum likelihood 
estimation. A positive coefficient suggests that a unit increase in the covariate accelerates the 
exit, while a negative coefficient decelerates the exit. Specifically, we estimate a frailty Cox 
                                                             
11
 For detailed discussions of Hofstede measure see Beugelsdijk, Kostova and Roth (2017) 
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model which is similar to a fixed-effects model in a linear regression. Our model controls for 
µIL[HGHIIHFWV¶ LQWHUPVRIKHWHURJHQHLW\DFURVV9&ILUPV7KHPRGHOHVWLPDWHVDQDGGLWLRQDO
parameter theta, which indicates the presence of such heterogeneity. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
Devigne et al. (2016) highlight the need for further research on the variation of VC 
deal-level returns across different exit routes. Panel A of Table 1 reports the annual rates of 
return earned by VC firms from fully exited investments as measured by the IRR. The figures 
are presented by regions (North America, the UK, Continental Europe, and the ROW) and 
exit routes (IPOs and M&A). In almost all regions and for all exit routes, cross-border 
investments generate lower IRR than domestic deals (except for investments exited through 
IPOs by VC firms in the ROW).12 
Next, we examine the PME, which we interpret as a measure of relative and risk-
adjusted performance as outlined in section 3. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the mean PMEs 
for domestic investments range from 2.02 to 2.86 depending on region. PMEs above 2 
suggest that the wealth generated by VC investments in domestic portfolio companies is more 
than twice the wealth generated by investments in public markets. In contrast, the mean 
PMEs for cross-border investments range from just 1.4 to 1.7. We find statistically 
significantly higher PMEs for domestic investments in almost all regions except for the 
ROW. In North America, the mean domestic PME is twice that of cross-border investments. 
                                                             
12Median IRR for the ROW also show that domestic investments outperform cross-border investments. The 
average and median returns on domestic investments by ROW VC firms are comparable to those reported for 
Asia-Pacific VC firms during 1989±2001 in Cumming et al. (2009). 
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The difference between domestic and cross-border PMEs is particularly pronounced for 
investments which were exited through IPOs, with the domestic PMEs in North America 
being almost three times the cross-border PMEs. We find a similar pattern for the median 
PMEs of North American VC firms. With such firms, median PMEs are significantly higher 
for domestic investments than cross-border investments. However, differences in medians are 
not statistically significant for the other regions. The magnitude of our overall median PME 
for domestic North American investments is comparable to that reported by Harris, 
Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014). 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
We examine whether VC investors select deals abroad which are systematically 
different from their domestic deals and whether certain types of VC backers self-select 
cross-border investments. Our univariate analysis in Table 2 examines the characteristics of 
cross-border and domestic investments. Table 2 presents the figures by regions. With 
regard to VC firms from all four regions, we find that those firms engaging in cross-border 
investments are on average significantly older (more experienced) than those involved in 
domestic investments. The average (mean) difference in age between firms backing cross-
border portfolio companies compared with those investing in domestic companies is 
broadly similar at approximately 2.5±2.7 years for VC firms in all regions except North 
America. 13  Among North American VC firms, the age difference is much more 
pronounced and is between seven and nine years (based on medians and means 
respectively). This clearly shows that cross-border investments are undertaken by seasoned 
VC firms, a finding which is consistent with those for the US reported by Cumming and 
Dai (2010). 
                                                             
13
 Based on median age, the results are broadly the same with the exception of the ROW, where the difference in 
medians is only half a year. 
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We find a similar but weaker effect in terms of the age of VC funds (rather than VC 
firms). Across all regions, it appears that cross-border deals are carried out by older funds. 
However, this difference between domestic and cross-border deals is marginally significant 
(at 10%) based on the means of fund age; based on medians, the difference is insignificant. 
Perhaps the fund age difference reflects a tendency of funds to invest first in domestic deals 
SHUFHLYHG WR EH OHVV ULVN\ DQG WR GHOD\ µJDPEOLQJ¶ RQ SRWHQWLDOO\ PRUH ULVN\ cross-border 
investments until the funds have matured. Thus, once earlier domestic deals show signs of 
success, VC firms are safe in the knowledge that they can offset the potential risk of cross-
border deals against their existing domestic successes. 
On average, cross-border deals are larger in size than domestic deals except for those 
undertaken by Continental European VC firms, whose cross-border deals are smaller than 
domestic deals. This may be because European VC firms invest in cross-border regions with 
relatively underdeveloped institutions and capital markets.  
In each of the four regions, cross-border investments are exited more quickly than 
domestic investments. This finding is consistent with the higher costs of screening, 
monitoring, and fostering cross-border investments which cause VC backers to exit cross-
border investments more quickly than domestic investments. This result may also be driven 
by the propensity of VC firms to invest in cross-border ventures only later in the life of VC 
funds, leaving less time to realize investments before funds are wound up. 
Liquidity is defined as the level of stock market activity which VC firms face in a 
SRUWIROLR FRPSDQ\¶V country of origin. Table 2 shows average liquidity across the four 
regions. Liquidity is higher for North American VC firms investing in domestic companies 
than the liquidity these North American VC firms face when investing abroad. These results 
are clearly unsurprising given the highly developed North American capital markets. 
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Focusing on VC firms in other regions, we find that European and UK VC investors face 
more liquidity in their domestic markets than in their cross-border destinations. In contrast, 
VC firms in the ROW seem to come from countries with markets which are on average less 
liquid than the markets in their cross-border destinations. In sum, most VC firms find lower 
liquidity in their cross-border destinations than in their domestic markets. 
In terms of syndication, our results show significant differences between domestic and 
cross-border VC deals, with cross-border deals being more likely to be syndicated in all 
regions except in the ROW. In particular, North American and UK VC firms syndicate cross-
border deals more frequently than domestic deals. UK VC firms are more than twice as likely 
to syndicate cross-border deals than domestic deals, and among North American VC firms, 
the frequency of syndicating cross-border deals is 54% higher than for domestic deals. We 
observe the opposite among VC firms in the ROW: these firms more frequently syndicate 
domestic deals, with approximately 70% of their domestic deals being syndicated compared 
with just 40% of their cross-border deals. Among Continental European VC firms, the 
proportion of syndicated deals is very similar for all (domestic and cross-border) deals. 
Because a high proportion of syndication may UHIOHFW9&LQYHVWRUV¶GHPDQGIRUULVN(or loss) 
sharing (e.g. Lerner 1994), our results may suggest that North American and UK VC firms 
perceive cross-border deals to be risky. In contrast, it is domestic deals which are seen to be 
riskier by VC firms in the ROW.  
In terms of the breakdown of financing stages, we find a consistent pattern among all 
cross-border deals, with approximately two-thirds of investments at the early stage, one-fifth 
at the expansion stage, and the rest (approximately 13±16%) at the later stage. This pattern is 
similar to the breakdown across financing stages of domestic deals by VC firms in the ROW. 
This finding may suggest a degree of convergence in terms of a global investment pattern. 
The breakdown in the three other regions is broadly similar, although there are some 
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differences. Notably, North American VC firms have a greater tendency to invest at early 
stages domestically rather than abroad. This approach may reflect the aversion of such VC 
firms to the higher risk of cross-border early-stage investments compared with domestic 
early-stage deals. European and UK VC firms differ from the global pattern in terms of their 
domestic deals, with a greater preference for expansion-stage investments in domestic deals 
compared with other stages.  
In terms of industry sector, there is evidence of investment clustering. North 
American and ROW VC firms are more likely to invest in the IT sector, while European and 
UK VC firms are more likely to invest in industrials. In contrast to these regional variations, 
there is little difference between domestic and cross-border deals in each region (except for 
the biotechnology industry).14  
In conclusion, compared with domestic investments, cross-border deals are conducted 
by older VC firms and later in the life of a VC fund. Cross-border deals are larger (based on 
investment size) and more likely to be syndicated at later financing stages and in the 
biotechnology sector. In terms of performance, we find that cross-border investments are 
exited more quickly but at the expense of returns and with lower IPO frequency. The lower 
IRR and the shorter holding periods may both be due to systematic differences between 
domestic and cross-border investments. These differences could be because VC firms target 
mature companies and later-stage financing when crossing borders. Hence, the risk/return 
profile of these investments may differ from domestic VC investments. Using PME as a risk-
adjusted measure of performance, we nevertheless find that domestic investments outperform 
cross-border investments in almost all regions. In the next section, we examine the 
                                                             
14
 Panel B of Table 2 shows the natural logarithms of VC age, fund age and investment size which are used in 
our multivariate analysis. 
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performance of domestic and cross-border investments in the context of a multivariate 
analysis. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
In order to conduct a formal test of hypothesis 1 (which posits that cross-border and 
domestic VC investments generate the same returns), we estimate two-stage Heckman 
models. The first stage (reported in panel A of Table 3) estimates the probability of a given 
deal being a cross-border investment; the second stage regresses deal-level performance on 
the cross-border indicator and a range of control variables.15 Performance is measured as IRR 
in panel B and PME in panel C. We control for risk by including indicators for the financing 
stage. Studies suggest financing stage as a suitable proxy for deal risk (Sahlman 1990; 
Ruhnka and Young 1991; Seppa and Laamanen 2001; Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist 
2013). 
The results are shown in Table 3.16 Panel A of the table shows the results for IRR. We 
find a statistically significant negative coefficient of the cross-border indicator in each of the 
four regressions (models I±IV). This finding is consistent with our univariate analysis 
reported in Table 1. Our multivariate analysis confirms this cross-border effect in terms of 
lower IRR, even after controlling for risk and other potential determinants of performance. 
The magnitude of this cross-border coefficient ranges from -0.27 for the UK to -0.156 (for 
the ROW). This result suggests that cross-border investments have significantly lower IRR 
                                                             
15
 We focus here on the second stage of the two-stage models. The first stage involves a probit model with 
cross-border as the dependent variable and aggregate capital inflow as an instrument, as outlined in section 3. 
The results of this first stage are discussed in greater detail in the extensions of our baseline analysis in section 
4.5. 
16
 There is no evidence of multicollinearity among the variables used in our study. Appendix C provides a 
correlation matrix for the variables used in the analysis. 
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on average, statistically and economically, than comparable domestic investments for VC 
firms based in any of the four regions. The cross-border coefficient in North America (model 
1) is -0.192, indicating that, all else being equal, cross-border investments by North American 
VC firms underperform equivalent domestic investments by 19% in terms of IRR. With 
regard to VC firms in other regions, cross-border underperformance ranges from 16% for VC 
investors in the ROW to 27% for the UK.  
In panel B of Table 3, the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted measure of 
performance (PME). Consistent with the IRR results in panel A and the univariate analysis 
(Table 1), we find that the PME for cross-border investments is lower than the PME for 
domestic investments. This result confirms that domestic investments outperform cross-
border investments and that this performance difference persists after controlling for risk and 
other known performance determinants.  
 Next, we examine whether this cross-border effect is a long-term feature of the VC 
industry or whether it is concentrated in the early years of the internationalization of VC 
investments. The literature finds that the period prior to the late 1990s is characterized by 
high returns on VC investments in North America, while the subsequent period experienced 
significantly lower VC fund returns and large capital inflow resulting in the saturation of the 
VC industry (Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan 2014). We examine whether this performance 
decline occurred equally among cross-border and domestic investments. A priori, we may 
expect that high capital inflow into a saturated industry leads to a decline in the performance 
of domestic and cross-border investments. However, some of this decline may be offset by 
positive learning effects derived from cross-border investments. Thus, we may expect less of 
a performance decline among cross-border investments initiated in the late 1990s. Harris et 
al. (2014) show that the decline in VC performance started in the late 1990s. The literature 
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(e.g. Aizenmann and Kendall 2012) also suggests that cross-border VC investing accelerated 
during the 1990s because of shortages in profitable domestic investment opportunities. We 
use 1997 as the cut-off point to divide our sample. Further, we include a binary indicator 
(post-1997) coded as zero for investments made up to 1997 and as one thereafter. We include 
post-1997 in our multivariate analyses both on its own (un-interacting) and interacting with 
the cross-border indicator.17 
Table 3 reports a significant negative coefficient for the un-interacted post-1997 
variable, suggesting that performance declined for all investments, namely for domestic and 
cross-border deals, after the late 1990s. The coefficients of the interaction terms cross-border 
and post-1997 are positive and in some cases as large (in absolute terms) as the cross-border 
coefficient. However, because these coefficients do not differ from zero at conventional 
levels of statistical significance, it appears that the performance differential between cross-
border and domestic investments remains unchanged post-1997. This result leads us to 
conclude that the cross-border effect is a permanent feature. 
We consider several further moderating factors.18 We report our results in Table 3 
separately for four broad regions. This regional breakdown is based on the origin of the VC 
investors. We observe underperformance of cross-border investments in all four regions 
despite the differences between these regions in terms of the institutional and cultural 
environments in which VC firms operate. We further explore whether our results depend on 
the destination (as opposed to the origin) of cross-border deals. To this end, we separate the 
cross-border indicator used in our multivariate analysis reported in Table 3 into three binary 
variables depending on deal destination. Focusing on the investments by North American VC 
                                                             
17
 We also use 1998 and 1999 as cut-off points. Our results remain unchanged. 
18
 The results of the additional analyses, including deal destination and VC experience as moderating factors, are 
not tabulated here but are available from the authors on request. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for 
suggesting this analysis of moderating factors. 
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firms, we find that cross-border deals in the ROW underperform domestic deals the most, by 
more than 10% (the coefficient of cross-border deals in the ROW is -0.11). Investments in the 
UK underperform the least (2.5%), with the underperformance of deals in Europe at 6%. 
While the magnitude of underperformance appears to vary by destination, we conclude that 
cross-border investments consistently underperform domestic investments worldwide. 
Next, we examine whether our results differ for subsets of VC firms, specifically 
whether more experienced VC investors show less cross-border underperformance. 
Measuring experience as VC Age, which represents the number of years a VC firm has been 
in business, we extend the models reported in Table 3 by including as an additional variable 
the cross-border indicator interacting with a binary variable coded one for the most 
experienced quartile of VC firms (and zero otherwise). We find the coefficient of this 
interaction term statistically not different from zero in all regions except ROW (where it is 
positive but statistically significant at only 10%). We conclude that there is no evidence of a 
differential effect of cross-border investing for top-tier VC investors. 
All of our multivariate analyses control for a range of statistically significant 
determinants of performance. Specifically, the control variables include VC age, investment 
size, investment duration, fund age, liquidity, syndication, financing stage, year, and industry. 
Except for fund age and syndication, we find that all of these control variables have a 
statistically significant impact on VC ILUPV¶performance. VC age increases IRR and PME in 
all regions, suggesting that more experienced VC backers are better at selecting, nurturing, 
and exiting investments. Large investments are associated with lower IRR and PME in all 
regions. This suggests that VC providers require higher returns for smaller investments to 
compensate them for higher (business) risk. We find that investment duration (i.e. the holding 
period, or time to exit, of VC backers) has a significantly positive impact on IRR and PME in 
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all regions. It appears that VC backers require higher returns to compensate them for longer 
holding periods. Investments which are held for a longer period are likely to be early-stage 
investments for which VC backers require higher average returns to compensate for 
(liquidity, etc.) risk. Another possible reason for this positive impact of Investment Duration 
on IRR could be the tendency of VC investors to hold promising (and ultimately profitable) 
investments longer in order to maximize the future gains from a successful exit. 
Next, we examine the impact of market liquidity on IRR and PME. Cumming, 
Fleming, and Schwienbacher (2005) focus on variations in the liquidity of exit markets in 
WHUPVRIµOLTXLGLW\ULVN¶7KH\ILQGWKDWZKHQWKHOLTXLGLW\RIH[LWPDUNHWV LVKLJK9&ILUPV
tend to invest more in later-stage rather than early-stage ventures. Cochrane (2005) 
documents that early-stage returns are higher than later-stage returns. Based on the foregoing 
studies, one may expect that the returns to VC firms are likely to be low when market 
liquidity is high. This reasoning may suggest that liquidity has a negative coefficient in our 
models. However, because we control for the financing stage, we should not expect to find an 
incremental negative impact of market liquidity on IRR and PME.19 Nevertheless, we find 
statistically significant negative coefficients of liquidity in all of the models. Our results 
suggest that over and above the impact of liquidity on VC investment decisions (specifically 
the choice of financing stage), PRUHOLTXLGPDUNHWVPRWLYDWH9&ILUPVWRµUXVKWRH[LW¶DWWKH
expense of lower returns.  
 The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (lambda) is statistically significant at the 
10% level in only some of the regions, specifically in the models for North America and 
Europe in panel A, and only in Europe in panel B. This finding suggests that adjusting for 
selection bias and endogeneity is only important in some of the regions, thereby confirming 
                                                             
19
 We thank an anonymous referee for helping to clarify our interpretation. 
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that the cross-border effect which we document is not the result of differential deal selection 
by VC backers. Instead, our results show that cross-border deals underperform equivalent 
domestic deals. In the section 4.6, we discuss alternative modelling approaches, including 
mixed-effects models and propensity score matching, and conclude that our finding of cross-
border underperformance is robust.20 
In conclusion, our results show that cross-border investments have significantly lower 
returns (in terms of IRR and PME) than domestic investments after controlling for risk, 
which has financing stage as a proxy, and a range of other potential determinants of 
performance. On the basis of our results, we do not find support for hypothesis 1. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.3 Alternative measures of performance 
We test differences between cross-border and domestic investments in terms of exit 
routes and time to exit. In the absence of detailed cash flow data, prior studies focus on exit 
success as a proxy of VC performance measurement. Our analysis examines the robustness of 
this approach in the context of examining cross-border investments. 
Some exit routes benefit VC investors more than others. IPO exits and exits through 
M&A, such as trade sales or secondary buyouts, generate positive financial returns (IRR, as 
reported by Cumming 2008), while write-offs (liquidations) typically result in the loss of the 
VC investments &XPPLQJ'DL HW DO µ6XFFHVVIXO¶H[LWVDOVRHQKDQFHYHQWXUH
capitDOLVWV¶ UHSXWDWLRQs and provide opportunities to raise additional funds from limited 
partners (LPs). Our first measure of exit performance is the so-FDOOHGµVXFFHVVUDWLR¶ZKLFK
                                                             
20
 The results of propensity score matching are discussed in section 4.6. The unreported mixed-effects models 
are presented in Table 7 but without the measures of distance. The results of the unreported analyses are 
available from the authors on request. 
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UHIOHFWV WKH IUHTXHQF\RI µVXFFHVVIXO¶H[LWV IURPSRUWIROLRFRPSDQLHV $ QDUUow measure of 
the success ratio considers only IPO exits as successes and is defined as the ratio of IPO exits 
to all exits. A broader version of the success ratio which considers both IPO and M&A exits 
as successes is defined as the ratio of IPO and M&A exits to all exits. Prior studies have 
examined the success ratio as an indicator of VC performance (e.g. Hochberg et al. 2007; 
Chen et al. 2010; Cumming and Dai 2010; Wang and Wang 2012; Nahata et al. 2014; Dai 
and Nahata 2016).  
Our second measure of perfRUPDQFH LV WKH OHQJWKRI9&EDFNHUV¶KROGLQJSHULRGV LQ
terms of the time from the first VC investment in a given portfolio company to the exit of the 
VC backer. Prior evidence suggests that VC backers realize their investments, on average, 
after 7 years, with the time to exit ranging from 6.5 years to more than 8 years, depending on 
the exit route (Giot and Schwienbacher 2007). 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the M&A route is the most common type of successful 
exit, followed by IPOs. Focusing on IPO exits, we find no significant difference between 
cross-border and domestic investments in the proportion of IPO exits in all regions, except 
North America. With regard to North American VC firms, we find that IPO exits are less 
likely for cross-border investments, with only 6% of cross-border deals resulting in an IPO 
exit. On the basis of this success ratio, cross-border investments are less successful than 
domestic deals for North American VC firms. However, perhaps IPO frequency is not an 
appropriate indicator of success, given that an M&A exit can also be attractive in terms of 
returns. Defining the success ratio more broadly as the combined proportion of IPO and 
M&A exits relative to all exits, we find no significant difference between domestic and cross-
border deals.  
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Panel B of Table 4 reports the investment-holding period (the time to exit) by region 
and exit route. The results of the full sample show that irrespective of the location of the VC 
firms, cross-border investments are exited more quickly than domestic investments. This 
finding is consistent with the higher costs of screening, monitoring, and fostering cross-
border investments, tipping the balance towards quicker exits from cross-border than 
domestic investments. This result may also be driven by the propensity of VC firms to invest 
in cross-border ventures only later in the lives of their VC funds, leaving less time to realize 
investments before the funds are wound up (see Table 2). Examining the results separately by 
region and exit route, we find the same type of cross-border effect (a shorter cross-border 
holding period) for all of the investments by North American VC firms irrespective of exit 
route. We also find the same effect for all IPO exits irrespective of region. However, outside 
North America, VC firms have longer holding periods in cross-border investments which are 
exited through M&A than for their corresponding domestic investments. Judging the 
performance of VC investments in terms of time to exit, it appears that cross-border 
investments are more successful than domestic investments, at least for North American VC 
firms. 
Given the conflicting evidence on the exit success of cross-border investments by 
North American VC firms in panels A and B, we suspect that exit behaviour is driven 
primarily by country-specific and other macro factors and does not reflect the selection and 
value-adding behaviour of North American VC backers.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
In order to examine whether cross-border deals are exited more quickly even after 
controlling for macro factors and VC and deal characteristics, we estimate a multivariate Cox 
hazard model. Table 5 shows the results of this model with the holding period (time to exit) 
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as the dependent variable and an indicator for cross-border deals, controlling for VC age, fund 
age, investment size, market liquidity (liquidity), syndication, financing stage, investment 
year, and industry of the portfolio company. We find that, all else being equal, VC firms exit 
cross-border investments significantly more quickly than domestic investments. This effect is 
observed in all four regions and is strongest in the UK and weakest in North America.  
Next, we examine whether the exit behaviour of VC firms and the cross-border effect 
on exits differ before and after the late 1990s. Speedier exits in the latter period may be due 
to a learning effect whereby VC firms become better over time at achieving quicker exits. 
Since VC cross-border investing is a more recent activity than domestic investments, we may 
expect this learning effect to impact cross-border deals in particular. To this end, we define a 
time indicator which takes the value of zero for all investments in the years up to 1997 and 
one thereafter.  
In the models shown in Table 5, we include the post-1997 indicator and interact it 
with the cross-border indicator. The coefficient of post-1997 is positive and significant for 
Europe and the UK, showing increasing exit rates since the late 1990s in these regions 
possibly due to a learning effect. The coefficient of post-1997 interacting with cross-border is 
also positive and significant in all regions, suggesting that the increase in exit speed has been 
particularly pronounced for cross-border investments. 
 Consistent with prior studies (Giot and Schwienbacher 2007; Espenlaub et al. 2015), 
we find that larger deals are exited more quickly. Investment size may increase the VC 
EDFNHUV¶ PDUJLQDO FRVWV RI FRQWLQXLQJ ZLWK DQ LQYHVWPHQW LQ WHUPV RI PRQLWRULQJ DQG
advisory costs) relative to marginal benefits, thereby tipping the balance in favour of an 
earlier exit.  
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 Fund age at the time of VC investments is also a significant determinant of exit rates. 
Investments from funds which are more mature at the time of the investments have higher 
exit rates than investments made from younger funds. In some regions, the effect of fund age 
is particularly strong for the oldest quartile of funds (as shown by Fund age x top25th). 
 Finally, we examine the impact of the liquidity in the stock market of the investment 
region (i.e. the region of thHSRUWIROLRFRPSDQ\¶VFRXQWU\RIRULJLQ%DVHGRQWKHILQGLQJVRI
Black and Gilson (1998), Cumming et al. (2006), and Wang and Wang (2012), we expect 
more liquid capital markets to facilitate speedier exits and higher exit rates. Consistent with 
this conjecture, we find that Liquidity has a strongly significant positive impact on exit rates 
in all four regions.  
 As a final control variable, we include in Table 5 an indicator of syndicated 
investments. Consistent with Giot and Schwienbacher (2007), we find that syndicated 
investments have higher exit rates than other investments. This suggests that by combining 
expertise and networks, syndicates are able to facilitate speedier exits.  
After controlling for a number of factors, our results show that cross-border 
investments are exited more quickly than domestic investments. However, if we were to 
conclude from this that cross-border investments are more successful than domestic 
investments, this would be at odds with our analysis of returns performance in Table 3. Our 
results suggest that VC investors may choose to invest abroad to benefit from shorter holding 
periods, but they do so at the expense of returns. Our results highlight that alternative 
measures of performance may result in fundamentally different assessments of success.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.4 The effect of distance 
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So far our analysis examines the difference between domestic and cross-border 
investing using a simple binary indicator. Our results suggest that foreignness (as captured by 
our cross-border indicator) is a liability. In this section, we try to unpack the aspects of 
foreignness which drive our results. In our earlier analysis, we treat investments by US VC 
firms in Canada the same as a US VC firm investing in China. Clearly, the latter process is 
significantly costlier to an investing US VC firm than the former because of the greater 
geographical distance involved as well as cultural and regulatory differences, and differences 
in political risk.  
In panel B of Table 6, our analysis breaks down cross-border investing into ventures 
in neighbouring countries (which share a land border) and non-neighbouring countries.21 In 
addition to cross-border (which continues to be coded as one if a VC firm invests in a foreign 
country and zero otherwise), we now also include the binary variable cross-border (not 
sharing) to capture the effect of investments in non-neighbouring countries. Cross-border 
(not sharing) is coded as one if the deal is located in a non-neighbouring foreign country and 
zero otherwise.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of a mixed-effects model of IRR for North 
America and Europe.22 In both regions, we find the coefficient of cross-border (not sharing) 
to be significant and negative, with a coefficient which is almost three times as large in 
absolute terms than that of the cross-border indicator. The latter coefficient is slightly smaller 
than in our earlier analysis reported in Table 3 (models I and II of panel A) but is still 
                                                             
21
 Panel A of Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the additional variables used in the analyses presented in 
panels B and C of Table 6. 
22The mixed-effects analyses in panels B and C of Table 6 model investment year and industry of the portfolio 
company as fixed effects and financing stage as random effects. Our choice between fixed and random effects is 
based on likelihood ratio tests. Following common practice in the relevant literature (e.g. Chemmanur et al. 
2016; Degeorge, Martin, and Phalippou 2016), industry fixed effects are included to control for unobserved 
time-invariant industry characteristics. Our results may be biased if the unobserved industry characteristics are 
time variant. We thank an anonymous referee for noting this issue. 
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statistically significant and negative. The difference between the cross-border and cross-
border (not sharing) coefficients is statistically significant, suggesting that cross-border 
investments involving countries which do not share a land border underperform compared 
with domestic investments significantly more than cross-border investments in neighbouring 
countries. We conclude that there is a significant QHJDWLYHµFURVV-cross-ERUGHUHIIHFW¶23 
Next, we examine whether the cross-border effect is driven by geographic distances, 
cultural disparities, or institutional differences between VC investors and portfolio companies. 
Studies report mixed evidence on the impact of geographic distances, cultural disparities, and 
institutional differences between VC firms and portfolio companies on the likelihood of a 
successful exit, typically an IPO exit (Chen et al. 2010; Cumming and Dai 2010; Nahata et al. 
2014; Chemmanur et al. 2016; Dai and Nahata 2016). Consistent with past evidence (Li et al. 
2014; Nahata et al. 2014; Dai and Nahata 2016), we predict that geographic distances have no 
significant effect after controlling for other distance measures (see hypothesis 2a). However, 
we expect that cultural disparities and institutional differences reduce exit performance, as 
predicted by hypotheses 2b and 2c (see section 2).  
Unlike all prior studies of cross-border performance, our analysis measures 
performance based on deal-level returns (IRR) rather than a proxy of performance based on 
exit success (Hochberg et al. 2007). We use five different measures of distance, disparity, and 
difference: the logarithm of geographic distances (in miles) the cultural disparities between 
the countries of VC firms and portfolio companies, calculated as differences between 
countries in terms of Hofstede et al.¶V (2010) four cultural dimensions (power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance); and three measures of institutional 
differences between the home countries of VC firms and their portfolio companies 
                                                             
23
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this term and the associated analysis. 
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(differences in regulatory quality, political stability, and the legal systems). See section 2 and 
Appendix B for details of variables and data sources.  
Consistent with hypotheses 2b and 2c (see section 2), but contrary to the null 
hypothesis 2a, our results in panel C of Table 6 show that all five measures which capture 
geographic distances, cultural disparities, and differences in institutional environments have 
significant negative impacts on the returns performance of VC deals. The cross-border 
indicator also remains significant at the 10% level (except in model IV for the ROW). This 
suggests that a residual negative impact of foreignness remains over and above the negative 
impacts of geographic distances, cultural disparities, and institutional differences. In the next 
section, we examine further possible explanations for this cross-border effect.  
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.5 Extensions 
In order for our conclusion that cross-border investments underperform domestic 
investments to be valid, we need to demonstrate that the differences in returns are not merely 
due to differences in risk. This part of our analysis examines the relative risk of cross-border 
and domestic deals. Note that there is no generally accepted measure of risk in the context of 
PE investments. This lack of a common measure is because one cannot observe a time series 
of market valuations for non-traded assets (such as PE stakes); thus, standard methods which 
are used to assess risk for standard traded assets are infeasible. As a result, in PE research, 
there are no standard approaches to correct for risk. Following Degeorge, Martin, and 
Phalippou (2016), we approximate investment risk in several ways. First, we examine the VC 
SURYLGHUV¶ULVNRIZHDOWKORVVEDVHGRQWKHLQYHVWPHQWPXOWLSOHVRIGRPHVWLFDQGFURVV-border 
investments in each of the four regions. Column (1) of Table 7 shows the proportions of 
domestic and cross-border VC investments with investment multiples of zero; namely, deals 
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which result in bankruptcies (write-offs) and thus a complete loss of wealth for VC providers. 
The second column (entitleG µCDSLWDO ORVV¶ VKRZVWKHSURSRUWLRQVRIGHDOVZLWK LQYHVWPHQW
multiples of less than one which result in (at least) a partial loss of wealth for VC providers. 
Using tests of differences in proportions, we conclude that there are no statistically (or 
economically) significant differences between domestic and cross-border investments for 
both these measures of risk. Next, we measure the systematic risk of VC investments in terms 
of their betas; namely, in terms of the sensitivity of the IRR of VC investments relative to 
returns on the stock market indices for the home countries of the portfolio companies. 
Following AxelsoQ6WUऺPEHUJ, and Sorensen (2013) and Degeorge et al. (2016), we estimate 
beta as the slope in a regression of IRR on the corresponding stock market return. We find no 
statistically significant differences between the betas of domestic and cross-border 
investments in any of the four regions.  
The final part of the analysis reported in Table 7 addresses the question of whether 
cross-border investing helps VC firms to diversify fund risk. Column (3) of Table 7 shows 
the betas of cross-border investments relative to the stock markets RI 9& SURYLGHUV¶ KRPH
FRXQWULHV:HFRPSDUHWKHUHVXOWLQJµKRPHEHWDV¶LQcROXPQWRWKHµKRVWEHWDV¶VKRZQLn 
column (2), which are calculated relative to the stock markets in the portfolio companies¶ 
countries. If VC providers are able to diversify their portfolios by investing abroad, we expect 
the IRR of cross-border deals to be less sensitive to the VC firms¶GRPHVWLFVWRFNLQGices than 
to the stock indices of the portfolio companLHV¶ countries. In other words, we expect to find 
the home betas to be lower than the host betas. Our results confirm that the home betas are 
statistically significantly lower than the host betas. While the host betas range between 2.5±
2.8, the home betas range between 1.2±1.4 for all regions except in the ROW. Our results 
suggest that VC firms from North America, Europe, and the UK significantly reduce their 
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exposure to (home) market risk by investing abroad. Consequently, they should expect lower 
returns from cross-border than from domestic investments. 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 Our final analysis examines another possible motive for VC firms to invest in cross-
border deals (besides diversification). Past evidence suggests that higher capital inflow into 
domestic VC industries has led to more competition among VC firms for promising deals. 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) refer to this as µPoney chasing deals¶. In a saturated domestic 
VC market characterized by an excess of funds and a shortage of investment opportunities, 
VC firms may seek investment opportunities abroad (Schertler and Tykvová 2011). We 
estimate a probit model to investigate the likelihood of a VC firm investing in cross-border 
deals. This investigation is the first stage of the Heckman model reported in panel A of Table 
3. Our explanatory variable of interest measures aggregate capital inflow into the domestic 
VC market (ln capital inflow). If cross-border investments are driven by limited domestic 
investment opportunities and saturation of the domestic VC market, we expect a positive 
coefficient for ln capital inflow in the probit model. The results of the probit model show a 
significant positive coefficient of ln capital inflow, which is consistent with the saturation 
argument.  
Overall, the results of our extended analysis show that VC firms benefit from cross-
border investing by achieving portfolio diversification and overcoming shortages of domestic 
investment opportunities in saturated markets. These benefits may explain the attraction of 
cross-border investing to VC investors, despite the poor returns performance of cross-border 
deals relative to domestic investments.  
4.6 Robustness 
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 We explore whether our models are subject to bias due to the non-randomness of VC 
exit decisions by using an approach similar to that of Cumming et al. (2009). In the sample 
used for our foregoing baseline analyses, we include only fully exited investments. As a 
robustness check, we start with a sample including all (fully exited, partially exited, and 
unexited) investments. We estimate a Heckman model for IRR similar to that reported in 
Table 3. In addition to the probit model of a 9&ILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRLQYHVWFURVV-border (as in 
Table 3), the extended Heckman model includes a second probit model of a 9& ILUP¶V
decision to exit its investment fully.24 We find no evidence of significant bias; thus, our 
results are qualitatively unchanged in all regions. The coefficients for our variable of interest, 
the cross-border indicator, with regard to the four regions remain broadly in line with those 
reported in our baseline analysis in Table 3 (see Appendix D). 
Our baseline analysis controls for deal syndication but not for possible endogeneity of 
syndication choice. In order to check the robustness of such possible endogeneity, we 
estimate a Heckman model for IRR with a probit stage which models the syndication decision, 
following Tian (2012).25 The results of this Heckman model remain qualitatively unchanged 
with the coefficient of interest, for the cross-border indicator, broadly the same as in our 
baseline analysis in Table 3 (see Appendix D). 
Our baseline analysis includes standard control variables for VC firms and funds; 
however, we examine whether omitting certain other VC control variables biases our results. 
Specifically, we control for the µEXV\QHVV¶of VC fund managers, following the literature on 
the trade-off between VC fund size and investment monitoring quality (Kanniainen and 
Keuschnigg 2003; Cumming 2006; Cumming and Walz 2010). Busyness is defined as the 
                                                             
24
 Full exits are coded one, while partial exits and no exits are coded zero. Explanatory variables are investment 
duration and economic conditions at exit, as in Cumming et al. (2009). The estimated coefficient of the lambda 
of this full-exit probit model is statistically insignificant.  
25
 Syndication is modelled as a function of the logarithms of capital inflow, VC age, fund age, and investment 
size. Unfortunately, the database we use does not allow us to differentiate between domestic and foreign 
syndication. 
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portfolio (fund) size per fund manager and is intended to measure the impact of lower 
amounts of managerial time and resources available for any one investment in larger funds. 
Adding busyness to the second stage of the Heckman model of IRR reported in Table 3, we 
find that busyness has a statistically significant (at 5%) negative coefficient which ranges 
between -0.07 in ROW and -0.12 in North America. However, comparing the cross-border 
coefficients of our baseline model with those of the extended model, we find that our key 
result, the cross-border effect, remains virtually unchanged in all regions (see Appendix D).  
Our baseline model in Table 3 includes year dummies for the investment years and 
controls for market conditions (in terms of market liquidity) at the times of exit. Next, we 
examine whether further controls for changes in market conditions during the investment-
holding periods (i.e. from investments to exits) affect our results. To this end, we measure the 
average returns of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index and the average 
risk-free returns between the dates of investment and the dates of exit. Including these 
additional control variables does not qualitatively affect our main results of interest; namely, 
our estimates of the coefficient of the cross-border indicator (see Appendix D). 
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results using propensity score matching. 
We match each cross-border deal with an equivalent domestic deal based on the propensity 
score estimated using VC age, investment size, fund age, investment duration, liquidity, 
syndication, and financing stage. Using caliper radius matching, we classify a domestic 
investment as a match for a cross-border investment when the propensity scores for both 
investments vary by no more than 1% (following e.g. Dehejia and Wahba 2002). We employ 
t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to confirm that the cross-border and matched domestic investments 
are not significantly different in terms of their mean and median characteristics. Using the 
sample of matched observations, we estimate a mixed-effects model (similar to the models 
reported in Table 3). Consistent with our prior results in Table 3, we find that the cross-
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border coefficient is lower than in our earlier analyses; however, it is still both statistically 
and economically significant (see Appendix D).26  
Overall, our results on the underperformance of cross-border investments remain 
robust. With regard to North America, we find cross-border coefficients ranging from -0.119 
to -0.196, from which we conclude that, all else being equal, the cross-border investments of 
North American VC firms underperform their domestic investments by between 12 and 20% 
in terms of IRR. Globally, our results are similarly robust, indicating cross-border investment 
underperformance between 22 and 25% for European VC investors, 25 and 28% for UK VC 
investors, and comparatively lower underperformance between 15 and 17% in the ROW. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Against the background of increasing cross-border financial flow, we examine the 
returns performance of cross-border VC investments. Because of data limitations, the 
literature analyses cross-border performance in terms of the likelihood of successful VC exit 
and reports conflicting results. The main contribution of our study is that we are able to 
estimate actual returns using detailed cash flow data which was unavailable to prior studies. 
We calculate IRR and PME for 6,529 deals conducted by VC firms in North America, the 
UK, Continental Europe, and the ROW during 1971±2008. We show that cross-border deals 
underperform domestic deals in terms of IRR by 12% to 28% depending on the region and 
research design. Similarly, we find significant cross-border underperformance in PME. 
Comparing deals before and after the late 1990s, performance is lower for all investments in 
                                                             
26
 Because propensity score matching is solely based on observable characteristics, it only addresses concerns of 
selection bias and endogeneity due to observable differences between treatment and control groups (e.g. Dehejia 
and Wahba 2002). In contrast, the two-stage Heckman models in Table 3 allow for endogeneity due to 
unobservable differences and omitted variables.  
 43 
the latter period; however, the performance differential between domestic and cross-border 
investments remains unchanged.  
Geographic distance, cultural disparity, and institutional differences between the 
home countries of a VC investor and a portfolio company negatively affect cross-border 
returns but do not fully explain cross-border underperformance. Moreover, our analysis 
confirms that differences in risk are unlikely to explain the variation in returns between cross-
border and domestic investments. Further analysis shows that VC firms benefit from cross-
border investing by achieving portfolio diversification and overcoming shortages of domestic 
investment opportunities in saturated markets. These benefits may explain the attraction of 
cross-border investing to VC firms despite the poor returns performance of cross-border deals 
relative to domestic investments. While VC firms may choose to invest abroad for many 
reasons, our results suggest that they should not expect to achieve higher deal-level returns 
when they do so. 
Our results are of clear relevance to VC fund managers (general partners) in guiding 
their portfolio decisions, including their considerations of relocating portfolio companies 
(Cumming et al. 2009). The results should also prove useful to investors (limited partners) in 
VC funds who need to understand the relative performance of cross-border and domestic 
investments in order to make sound fund-selection decisions and influence investment 
patterns. The negative impact of institutional differences on VC returns which we observe 
will be of interest to policymakers and regulators. 
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Table 1: Returns and PMEs at exit 
This table shows the mean and median IRR and PMEs by exit routes and regions of VC firms. We show the results 
for the full sample and for IPOs and M&A exits separately. Panel A shows IRR and panel B shows PMEs. We use 
statistical tests to assess whether the performance of cross-border investments differs significantly from domestic 
deals. The t-test for each mean is based on an unequal sample and unequal variance. The test for differences in 
medians is the Wilcoxon test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels respectively. 
Panel A: IRR North America Europe (Ex. UK) UK ROW  
 
 Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Full sample           
Mean  46.69 28.73** 43.02 24.47*** 34.16 18.90** 27.54 41.69** 
Median  24.76 21.45* 17.52 23.68* 19.99 14.99* 27.15 24.32* 
No of obs  3945 389 553 286 258 105 794 199 
IPO          
Mean  125.33 114.62* 112.86 101.91* 117.69 103.76* 85.88 118.09*** 
Median  42.63 39.32 30.42 40.72* 27.52 18.013* 45.69 41.67 
No of obs  861 25 82 41 69 28 95 23 
M&A          
Mean  77.58 49.99** 78.11 40.73** 54.47 37.94** 98.87 66.83** 
Median  11.30 12.30 12.18 11.27 13.79 10.57 12.19 11.47 
No of obs  1575 195 342 139 136 58 542 118 
Panel B: PME 
Full sample          
Mean  2.86 1.40** 2.02 1.49* 2.04 1.74* 1.30 5.10** 
Median  1.20 0.89* 1.05 1.03 1.40 1.12 1.02 2.05* 
No of obs  3945 389 553 286 258 105 794 199 
IPO          
Mean  7.96 2.79*** 2.52 1.86** 2.58 1.95* 2.05 6.66 
Median  3.92 1.12** 1.54 1.00 1.06 0.88 1.98 1.08* 
No of obs  861 25 82 41 69 28 95 23 
M&A          
Mean  4.12 2.19** 2.20 1.71* 2.21 1.48* 1.92 4.48*** 
Median  2.45 0.98* 1.47 1.06 1.33 1.11 1.06 2.08** 
No of obs  1575 195 342 139 136 58 542 118 
 
 
   
 52 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of deal characteristics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for domestic and cross-border deals by regions. VC age is the age (years in 
business) of a VC firm at the time of an initial investment in a portfolio company. Fund age is the age of a fund 
measured from the date of the fund¶V initiation to the date of an investment. Investment size is the total amount invested 
by a VC firm in a portfolio company. Investment duration is the time between an initial VC investment and the VC exit 
date (in years). Liquidity is the stock market liquidity of a portfolio company¶VFRXQWU\ measured as the total value of 
shares traded on the stock exchange(s) divided by the country¶V gross domestic product (GDP). Syndication is a binary 
variable equal to one for syndicated deals and zero otherwise. We show figures for each of three financing stages 
(early, expansion, and later stage investments). Panel B shows natural logarithmic transformations of VC age, fund age 
and investment size. We use a statistical test to assess whether cross-border characteristics differ significantly from 
domestic characteristics. The t-tests for the means are based on unequal samples and unequal variances. Differences in 
medians are tested using the Wilcoxon test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
North America Europe (Ex. UK) UK ROW 
Variables  Dom Cross-border Dom 
Cross-
border Dom 
Cross-
border Dom 
Cross-
border 
 
         
VC age (years)          
Mean  4.64  13.65** 8.36 11.12* 10.56 13.05* 5.17 7.66* 
Median  4.00 11.00** 7.50 10.00* 8.92 10.75* 4.54 5.00 
 
         
Fund age (years)          
Mean  2.35 3.94* 1.72 2.09* 1.88 2.89* 2.31 3.61* 
Median  2.08 2.25 1.15 1.13 1.25 1.10 1.50 2.13 
 
         
Investment size (USD 
million) 
         
Mean  4.69 6.28** 4.39 2.16** 3.01 4.93* 5.15 7.13* 
Median  1.15 2.15** 2.02 1.51** 1.86 2.00* 2.30 2.54 
          
Investment duration 
(years) 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Mean (years)  4.74 3.44** 3.88 3.20* 3.98 3.15* 3.90 3.10** 
Median (years)   4.00 3.14* 3.32 3.11* 3.50 3.01* 3.42 3.08*  
Liquidity          
Mean  1.46 0.91*** 1.10 0.84** 1.29 1.01* 0.56 1.20** 
Median  1.24 0.75*** 1.01 0.81* 1.15 0.86* 0.55 0.94** 
  
 
 
 
 
    
Syndication (binary)          
Yes  36.70 56.98** 48.56 49.43 32.97 72.97** 68.93 40.07** 
No  63.30 43.09** 51.44 50.57 67.03 27.03** 31.07 59.94** 
  
 
 
 
 
    
Financing stages 
(binary) 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Early  72.26 67.23*** 59.47 67.84 53.06 66.06 67.56 61.52 
Expansion  23.81 19.79*** 38.85 18.92*** 37.51 18.04** 19.61 21.73 
Later  3.94 12.98*** 1.68 13.23*** 9.44 15.90* 12.83 16.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Industry (binary)  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Biotechnology  2.58 7.26** 6.89 12.95** 6.71 9.68** 7.191 2.91*** 
Consumer Goods and 
Services 
 16.77 11.33* 11.20 15.59 10.95 13.32 11.403 20.00*** 
Financials  2.38 2.26 2.22 4.54** 2.02 2.61 2.29 3.20 
Industrials  16.42 19.53* 58.20 51.30 58.76 53.05 1.50 21.43 
Information Technology  60.34 57.11 19.12 15.10 18.17 20.04 59.13 52.38* 
Others  1.51 2.51* 2.37 0.52* 3.39 1.29* 0.48 0.09** 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
No of deals  3945 389 553 286 258 105 794 199 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Panel B: Logarithm transformations 
 
VC age (years)          
Mean  1.63 2.47 2.44 2.37 2.33 2.63 1.81 2.19 
Median  1.55 2.32 2.38 2.27 2.26 2.47 1.66 1.69 
 
 
        
Fund age (years)          
Mean  0.94 1.49 0.75 0.81 0.82 1.09 0.87 1.39 
Median  0.92 0.88 0.21 0.14 0.38 0.11 0.55 0.81 
 
 
 
 
      
Investment size (USD 
million) 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Mean  1.77 1.87 1.05 1.01 1.22 1.74 1.79 2.04 
Median  0.38 0.84 1.01 0.74 0.78 0.88 0.88 1.02 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis (two-stage model) 
 
This table presents the results of a two-stage Heckman model of VC performance. Stage 1 in panel A shows the 
probability of investing in cross-border deals using probit models. The dependent variable is equal to one if the 
investment is a cross-border deal and zero otherwise. At stage II, the dependent variable is IRR measured as annualized 
IRR in panel B. The dependent variable is PME in panel C. Capital inflow is the logarithm of the total amount of funds in 
the VC industry. Cross-border is one for cross-border investments and zero otherwise. We include a binary indicator, 
post-1997, which is equal to zero for investments up to 1997 and one thereafter. Cross-border x post-1997 is cross-
border interacting with post-1997. Ln VC age is the natural logarithm of age (years in business) of a VC firm at the time 
of an initial investment in a portfolio company. Ln fund age is the natural logarithm of fund age measured from the date 
of a fund¶V initiation to the date of an investment. Ln investment size is the natural logarithm of the total amount invested 
by a VC firm in a portfolio company. Investment duration is the number of years from an initial VC investment to VC 
exit. Ln fund age top25th is the natural logarithm of fund age for funds above the 75th age percentile and zero otherwise. 
Liquidity is the stock market liquidity of a portfolio company¶VFRXQWU\ measured as the total value of shares traded on 
the stock exchange(s) divided by the country¶V GDP. Syndication is a binary variable equal to one for syndicated deals 
and zero otherwise. aWe include two binary financing stage indicators for expansion and later stage investments (with 
early stage as the base). We also include dummies for a portfolio company¶V industry and (investment) year. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A Model I:  
North America 
Model II:  
Europe (Ex. UK) 
Model III:  
UK 
Model IV:  
ROW 
Variables Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
         
Ln capital inflow 0.013*** (0.000) 0.027** (0.016) 0.012** (0.036) 0.003 (0.115) 
Ln VC age 0.002** (0.039) 0.001** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.000) 0.004 (0.234) 
Ln fund age 0.014* (0.091) 0.097* (0.074) 0.104** (0.017) 0.072* (0.092) 
Ln investment size 0.041** (0.041) 0.068*** (0.005) 0.020** (0.037) 0.020** (0.041) 
Liquidity 0.023*** (0.000) 0.002* (0.096) 0.027** (0.022) 0.012* (0.064) 
Syndication 0.016** (0.029) 0.003* (0.087) 0.009* (0.052) 0.006 (0.184) 
         
Industrya Present  Present  Present  Present  
Financing stagea Present  Present  Present  Present  
Investment year a Present  Present  Present  Present  
Pseudo R-square 0.166  0.131  0.089  0.111  
No of obs 4334  839  363  993  
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Table 3 continued 
Panel B Model I:  
North America 
Model II:  
Europe (Ex. UK) 
Model III:  
UK 
Model IV:  
ROW 
Variables Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Cross-border  -0.192** (0.033) -0.232** (0.017) -0.270** (0.023) -0.156** (0.017) 
Post-1997 × cross-border 0.047 (0.130) 0.173 (0.207) 0.036 (0.193) 0.250 (0.135) 
Post-1997  -0.339** (0.021) -0.379** (0.032) -0.117 (0.108) -0.252** (0.037) 
Ln VC age 0.011** (0.023) 0.015** (0.030) 0.018** (0.012) 0.050** (0.015) 
Ln fund age -0.141 (0.309) -0.126 (0.192) -0.233 (0.226) 0.264 (0.781) 
Ln investment size -0.238*** (0.000) -0.263*** (0.000) -0.320*** (0.000) -0.373*** (0.000) 
Investment duration 0.065** (0.030) 0.050** (0.045) 0.091** (0.030) 0.055* (0.088) 
Ln fund age top25th 0.066 (0.398) 0.057 (0.223) -0.059 (0.762) -0.276 (0.652) 
Liquidity -0.188** (0.024) -0.273** (0.011) -0.178** (0.026) -0.422** (0.050) 
Syndication 0.014 (0.743) 0.012 (0.222) 0.104 (0.458) 0.353* (0.086) 
Constant 0.173*** (0.000) 0.037** (0.044) 
 
0.152** (0.027) 0.154** 
 
(0.022) 
Lambda 0.605* (0.090) -0.477* (0.096) 
 
0.201 (0.244) -0.117 
 
(0.314) 
Industrya Present  Present  Present  Present  
Financing stagea Present  Present  Present  Present  
Investment year a Present  Present  Present  Present  
Adj R-square 0.141  0.077  0.044  0.066  
No of obs 4334  839  363  993  
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Table 3 continued 
 
 
Panel C Model I:  
North America 
Model II:  
Europe (Ex. UK) 
Model III:  
UK 
Model IV:  
ROW 
Variables Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Cross-border  -0.018** (0.020) -0.020** (0.016) -0.023** (0.042) -0.016** (0.035) 
Post-1997 × cross-border 0.002 (0.477) 0.004 (0.356) 0.007 (0.381) 0.041 (0.270) 
Post-1997 -0.019* (0.078) -0.024* (0.053) -0.021* (0.092) -0.061* (0.083) 
Ln VC age 0.001** (0.032) 0.007** (0.040) 0.001** (0.012) 0.002** (0.017) 
Ln fund Age -0.006 (0.306) -0.011 (0.144) -0.004 (0.766) 0.022 (0.254) 
Ln investment size -0.015*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.058*** (0.000) 
Investment duration 0.003** (0.021) 0.004** (0.024) 0.002** (0.029) 0.006* (0.056) 
Ln fund age top25th 0.023 (0.391) 0.008 (0.499) 0.009 (0.756) -0.036* (0.065) 
Liquidity -0.034** (0.040) -0.032** (0.033) -0.017** (0.023) -0.029* (0.075) 
Syndication 0.003 (0.219) 0.004 (0.216) 0.005 (0.663) 0.036* (0.089) 
Constant 0.014*** (0.000) 0.018** (0.031) 
 
0.016** (0.023) 0.014** 
 
(0.000) 
Lambda 0.021 (0.133) -0.034* (0.081) 
 
0.010 (0.255) 0.014 
 
(0.261) 
Industry Present  Present  Present  Present  
Financing stage Present  Present  Present  Present  
Investment year  Present  Present  Present  Present  
Adj R-square 0.13  0.084  0.050  0.074  
No of obs 4334  839  363  993  
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      Table 4: Investment types and holding periods (time to exit)  
Panel A shows the exit numbers by exit type and region. Full-sample proportions are relative to total (domestic and 
cross-border) exits by region. Proportions for each of the exit routes (IPO, M&A, and write-offs) are relative to 
either domestic or cross-border exits by region. The Z-test for the proportions is based on an unequal sample and 
unequal variance. Panel B shows the means and medians of investment durations (in years) by the method of exit 
and the region of VC firms. The t-test for each mean is based on an unequal sample and unequal variance. The t-test 
for each median is based on the Wilcoxon test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Panel A 
 North America Europe (Ex. UK) UK ROW 
 
 Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
 
Full sample 
         
Proportions 
 
0.910 0.090*** 0.659 0.341** 0.711 0.289** 0.800 0.200*** 
No of obs  3945 389 553 286 258 105 794 199 
IPO          
Proportions 
 
0.218 0.064** 0.148 0.143 0.267 0.266 0.120 0.116 
No of obs  861 25 82 41 69 28 95 23 
 
         
M&A          
Proportions  0.399 0.501 0.618 0.486* 0.527 0.552 0.683 0.593 
No of obs  1575 195 342 139 136 58 542 118 
          
Write-offs          
Proportions  0.383 0.434 0.233 0.371 0.205 0.181 0.198 0.291 
No of obs  1509 169 129 106 53 19 157 58 
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Table 4 continued 
 
 
Panel B  North America Europe (Ex. UK) UK ROW 
 
 Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Dom Cross-
border 
Full sample          
Mean (years)  4.74 3.44** 3.88 3.20* 3.98 3.15* 3.90 3.10** 
Median (years)   4.00 3.14* 3.32 3.11* 3.50 3.01* 3.42 3.08*  
No of obs  3945 389 553 286 258 105 794 199 
          
IPO          
Mean (years)  6.98 4.69** 6.08 4.68** 5.96 4.12** 4.73 3.12** 
Median (years)   6.88 4.17** 4.50 4.02* 4.51 4.00* 4.25 3.01** 
No of obs  861 25 82 41 69 28 95 23 
          
M&A          
Mean (years)  4.49 3.10* 4.37 4.83* 3.39 4.03* 3.43 4.82** 
Median (years)   3.97 3.09** 3.99 3.09* 3.01 3.83* 3.17 4.35** 
No of obs  1575 195 342 139 136 58 542 118 
          
Write-offs          
Mean (years)  2.13 1.90 2.02 2.02 2.85 2.45 1.83 2.11 
Median (years)   1.87 1.71 1.62 1.01 2.09 1.87 1.75   1.57 
No of obs  1509 169 129 106 53 19 157 58 
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                  Table 5: Cox proportional hazard model 
 
This table shows a Cox proportional (frailty) model of the VC exit rates estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation. Cross-border equals one for cross-border investments and zero otherwise. We include an interaction term 
of cross-border with post-1997, another interaction term of cross-border with Ln VC age, and a third with Ln 
investment size. Ln VC age is the natural logarithm of age (years in business) of a VC firm at the time of an initial 
investment in a portfolio company. Ln fund age is the natural logarithm of fund age measured from the date of a 
fund¶V initiation to the date of an investment. Ln investment size is the natural logarithm of the total amount invested 
by a VC firm in a portfolio company. Ln fund age top25th is the natural logarithm of the age of funds for funds 
above the 75th age percentile and zero otherwise. Liquidity is the stock market liquidity of a portfolio company¶V
country measured as the total value of shares traded on the stock exchange(s) divided by the country¶V GDP. 
Syndication is a binary variable equal to one for syndicated deals and zero otherwise. Theta is an indicator of 
heterogeneity (frailty). aWe include two binary financing stage indicators for expansion and later stage investments 
(with early stage as the base). We also include dummies for a portfolio company¶V industry and (investment) year 
for the years up to 1997. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Multivariate analysis of VC performance  
 
Model I: North 
America 
Model II: Europe 
(Ex. UK) 
Model III: UK Model IV: ROW 
Variables Coeff Hazard 
ratio Coeff 
Hazard 
ratio Coeff 
Hazard 
ratio Coeff 
Hazard 
ratio 
Cross-border 1.375*** 3.955 1.689** 5.417 2.519*** 12.411 2.329*** 10.267 
Cross-border × post-1997 2.324*** 10.221 0.248* 1.281 1.185** 3.269 2.522** 12.459 
Post-1997 0.276 1.318 0.915** 2.496 0.773* 2.167 0.377 1.458 
Ln VC age -0.018** 0.982 0.007* 1.007 0.002 1.002 0.002 1.002 
Ln fund age 0.153** 1.165 0.116* 1.122 0.380** 1.462 0.285* 1.330 
Ln investment size 0.221** 1.247 0.132** 1.141 0.127** 1.135 0.294** 1.341 
Ln fund age top25th 0.030 1.030 0.167** 1.182 0.077 1.080 0.040 1.041 
Liquidity 0.258*** 1.295 0.853*** 2.346 0.806** 2.238 0.205** 1.228 
Syndication 0.482*** 1.619 0.103* 1.108 0.145* 1.156 0.138 1.148 
Theta 0.799**  0.208**  0.163** 
 
 0.998*** 
 
 
Industrya Present  Present  Present  Present  
Financing stagea Present  Present  Present  Present  
Investment year a Present  Present  Present  Present  
Pseudo R-square 0.166  0.141  0.090  0.111  
No of obs 4334  839  363  993  
Censored obs 512  316  105  255  
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This table presents the results of mixed-effects models of VC performance. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics for the additional variables used in panels B and C which measure the absence of a shared land border 
(cross-border not sharing), geographic distance, cultural disparity, and regulatory differences between a VC 
ILUP¶V DQG portfolio FRPSDQ\¶V KRPH countries. Panel B shows the impact of cross-border investing on 
performance in countries with and without shared land borders. The dependent variable is IRR and is measured as 
annualized IRR. Cross-border is one for cross-border investments and zero otherwise. Cross-border (not sharing) 
is one for cross-ERUGHULQYHVWPHQWVLQFRXQWULHVZLWKRXWDODQGERUGHUZLWKWKH9&ILUP¶VKRPHFRXQWU\DQG]HUR
otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Table 3. Panel C shows the impact of measures of distance and 
regulatory and institutional differences on performance (IRR). Geographic distance is measured as the distance 
between the capitals of the respective countries of VC firms and portfolio companies. Cultural distance is 
determined as the differences in the Hofstede measures of culture (from Geert Hofstede's website) between the 
home countries of VC firms and their portfolio companies. Regulatory quality (diff) and political stability (diff) 
are the differences in the average scores of regulatory quality and political stability (as in Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2007, based on data from the World Bank). Legal system (diff) is a binary variable which takes a value 
of one if the countries of a VC firm and portfolio company have different legal systems and zero otherwise (based 
RQGDWDIURP5DIDHO/D3RUWD¶VZHEVLWH. Other control variables are as defined in Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate 
1%, 5%, and 10% conventional levels respectively. aThe mixed-effects analyses in panels B and C model 
investment year and portfolio company industry as fixed effects and financing stage as random. 
  Cross-border (all regions) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
Mean Median STD 
Cross-border (not sharing) 0.793 1.00 0.231 
Geographic distance (miles) 4651 4255 2610 
Cultural distance (#) 9.87 10.91 5.44 
Regulatory quality (diff) 2.00 4.00 37.00 
Political Stability (diff) 5.00 1.00 41.00 
Legal system (diff) 0.351 0.000 0.403 
Logarithmic values 
   
Geographic distance 8.755 8.355 1.184 
Cultural distance 2.105 2.187 0.645 
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Table 6 continued 
 
 
North America 
 
Europe 
Panel B: Mixed-effects  
models of IRR in 
(non-)neighbouring countries 
Coeff 
 
P-value 
 
 
 
Coeff 
 
P-value 
 
      Cross-border -0.151** (0.024) 
 
-0.205** (0.033) 
Cross-border not sharing border -0.417*** (0.001) 
 
-0.588*** (0.000) 
Ln VC age 0.020** (0.011) 
 
0.024** (0.021) 
Ln fund age -0.156 (0.254) 
 
-0.121 (0.301) 
Ln investment size -0.305*** (0.000) 
 
-0.286*** (0.000) 
Investment duration 0.082*** (0.000) 
 
0.074*** (0.000) 
Ln fund age top 75th 0.085 (0.251) 
 
0.099 (0.351) 
Liquidity -0.267*** (0.000) 
 
-0.302*** (0.000) 
Syndication 0.025 (0.254) 
 
0.021 (0.251) 
Constant 0.221*** (0.000) 
 
0.042*** (0.000) 
      Pseudo R-square 0.131 
  
0.110 
 No of Obs 4334 
  
839 
 Industry, stage, investment yeara Y 
  
Y 
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Table 6 continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model I:  
North America 
Model II:  
Europe (Ex. UK) 
Model III:  
UK 
Model IV:  
ROW 
Panel C: Mixed-effects  
models of IRR with distance 
measures 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Cross-border dummy -0.178* (0.073) -0.105* (0.092) -0.132* (0.061) -0.101 (0.118) 
Ln (geographic distance) -0.181* (0.080) -0.120* (0.090) -0.113* (0.058) -0.173* (0.055) 
Ln (cultural distance) -0.294* (0.084) -0.257* (0.094) -0.276* (0.092) -0.368* (0.082) 
Regulatory quality (diff) -0.004*** (0.004) -0.005** (0.046) -0.002** (0.021) -0.002* (0.091) 
Political stability (diff) -0.002* (0.075) -0.003* (0.059) -0.002* (0.072) -0.003* (0.052) 
Legal system (diff) -0.068 (0.478) -0.103 (0.329) -0.050 (0.601) -0.011 (0.293) 
Post-1997 -0.518*** (0.000) -0.250** (0.024) -0.483*** (0.000) -0.362*** (0.008) 
Ln VC age 0.018*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.000) 0.028*** (0.000) 0.055*** (0.000) 
Ln fund Age -0.155 (0.254) -0.215 (0.132) -0.196 (0.161) -0.072 (0.688) 
Ln investment size -0.293*** (0.000) -0.246**** (0.000) -0.332*** (0.000) -0.500*** (0.000) 
Investment duration 0.082*** (0.000) 0.082*** (0.000) 0.080*** (0.000) 0.034 (0.168) 
Ln fund age top25th 0.095 (0.394) 0.075 (0.544) 0.039 (0.727) 0.037 (0.364) 
Liquidity -0.269*** (0.000) -0.360 (0.308) -0.267*** (0.000) -0.263*** (0.005) 
Syndication 0.014 (0.291) 0.015 (0.187) 0.011 (0.390) 0.364** (0.025) 
Constant 0.205*** (0.000) 0.166** (0.041) 0.174*** (0.000) 0.144*** (0.000) 
         
Industry Present  Present  Present  Present  
Financing stage Present  Present  Present  Present  
Investment year  Present  Present  Present  Present  
Pseudo R-square 0.137  0.120  0.109  0.117  
No of obs 4334  839  363  993  
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Table 7: Alternative measures of risk (domestic vs cross-border deals) 
This table shows a comparison of domestic and cross-border deals using alternative measures of risk. Bankruptcy is calculated as the fraction of investments 
where the investment multiple is equal to zero. Capital loss is the fraction of investments where the multiple is less than one. Systematic risk is measured as the 
sensitivity of IRR to the local market index of VC firms with regard to domestic deals (1), the local market index of portfolio companies with regard to cross-
border deals (2), and the local market index of VC firms with regard to cross-border deals. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% conventional levels 
respectively. 
 
 Bankruptcy Capital loss  Systematic risk 
 
Domestic Cross-border Domestic Cross-border  
Domestic deals  
(local index of VC) 
(1) 
Cross-border deals  
(local index of portfolio) 
(2) 
Cross-border deals  
(local index of VC) 
(3) 
Diff  
(1)±(2) 
Diff  
(2)±(3) 
Regions 
  
        
   
   
   
  
North America 17% 20% 29% 31%  2.519 2.402 1.343 1.112 2.113** 
   
        
Europe 15% 18% 25% 32%  2.749 2.661 1.394 1.021 3.022*** 
   
        
UK 18% 19% 22% 24%  2.692 2.511 1.241 1.512 2.590** 
   
        
ROW 23% 24% 29% 33%  2.681 2.784 2.567 -1.041 1.481 
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Appendix A: Distribution of venture capital deals by region from 1971±2009  
  All deals 
(number) 
              North America (NA) 
 
            EU (Ex. UK) 
 
UK 
 
ROW 
 
Investment years   Domestic 
deals 
 (number) 
Cross-border 
(CB) 
 (number) 
CB to total NA 
(%) 
Domestic  
deals 
(number) 
Cross-border 
(CB) (number) 
CB to total EU 
(%) 
Domestic 
deals 
(number) 
Cross-border 
(CB) (number) 
CB to total 
UK 
(%) 
Domestic 
deals 
(number) 
Cross-border 
(CB) 
(number) 
CB to total 
ROW 
(%) 
1971±1980 35 35 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 
1981±1990 850 691 50 6.75 39 16 29.09 11 12 52.17 29 2 6.45 
1991±2000 4435 2595 194 6.95 424 216 33.75 178 77 30.20 621 130 17.31 
2001±2009 1209 624 145 18.86 91 54 37.24 67 17 20.24 145 66 31.28 
Total 6529 3945 389 8.97 554 286 34.05 256 106 29.28 795 198 19.94 
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Appendix B: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition of variable 
Cross-border A dummy variable taking a value of one if a portfolio company and the VC firm are 
located in different countries and zero otherwise. 
Cross-border not sharing A dummy variable taking a value of one if a portfolio company is located in a 
country which does not share a border with the home country of the VC firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Geographic distance Measured as the distance in miles between the capitals of the countries of a VC firm 
and portfolio company. We obtain the data from the CEPII website 
(www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). 
 
Cultural distance As in Dai and Nahata (2016), we follow the approach of Kogut and Singh (1988) and 
use the Hofstede measures of culture (i.e. power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance) to compute the cultural distance between a 
VC firm and a portfolio company. The data are obtained from Geert Hofstede¶V 
website (www.geerthofstede.nl). The following Cartesian distance measure is used to 
calculate cultural disparity:  
4
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where Clocal, i is the local VC ILUP¶Vculture based on measure i and Ccross-border, i is the 
cultural measure of a portfolio company based on measure i. 
Regulatory distance This is the difference in the regulatory quality score between the home countries of a 
VC firm and portfolio company. The score value for each country ranges between 0 
and 100. The data are obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) of 
the World Bank website  (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-
governance-indicators). 
Political distance This is the difference in the political stability score between the home countries of a 
VC firm and portfolio company. The score value for each country ranges between 0 
and 100. The data are obtained from the WGI of the World Bank website 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators). 
Legal system difference 
 
 
Capital inflow 
As in Chemmanur et al. (2016), this is a dummy variable coded 1 if the (common or 
civil law) origins of the legal systems of the home countries of a VC firm and 
portfolio company differ, and zero otherwise. The data are obtained from Rafael La 
Porta¶V website (http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/rafael-laporta/research-
publications). 
The aggregate amount of capital inflow into the VC industry in the home country of 
a VC firm in the year of investment. The data are obtained from the Preqin database. 
Ln VC age Natural logarithm of the age (years in business) of a VC firm at the time of an initial 
investment in a portfolio company. 
Ln investment size Natural logarithm of the total amount invested by a VC firm in a given portfolio 
company (in USD million). 
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Appendix B continued 
 
Ln fund age Natural logarithm of a fund¶V age measured in years from the date of the fund¶V 
initiation to the date of a VC investment in a given portfolio company. 
Ln fund age top25th Natural logarithm of a fund¶V age for older funds, specifically funds above the 75th 
age percentile, and zero otherwise. 
Investment duration The time between an initial VC investment and the VC exit date (in years).  
Liquidity Stock market liquidity of a portfolio company¶V country of origin measured as the 
ratio of the YDOXHRIVKDUHVWUDGHGRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VVWRFNH[FKDQJHVGLYLGHGE\WKH
country¶V GDP. 
Syndication A binary variable equal to one if the investment is syndicated and zero otherwise. 
IRR The internal rate of return (IRR) based on detailed information of investment cash 
flow, as described in section 3. IRR is winsorized at 1% in all analyses. 
PME Public market equivalent, as described in Section 3. 
Post-1997 Binary indicator equal to zero for investments up to 1997 and one thereafter.  
Year A set of binary indicator variables for the year of a VC investment. 
Financing stage Binary variables for a financing stage. We include an indicator for investments in 
expansion stages (zero otherwise) and another for investments in later stages (zero 
otherwise). Early stage investments are used as the base.  
Industry  A set of binary industry variables for a SRUWIROLRFRPSDQ\¶VSULPDU\LQGXVWU\IRFXV
We include indicators for biotechnology, consumer goods and services, financials, 
industrials, and information technRORJ\WUHDWLQJµoWKHUV¶DVWKHEDVH 
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Appendix C: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
Fund age (1) 1             
VC age (2) 0.169 1            
Investment size (3) -0.115 0.281 1           
IRR (4) 0.025 -0.003 -0.037 1          
PME (5) -0.006 -0.012 -0.005 0.003 1         
Holding period (6) 0.019 0.208 0.515 -0.032 -0.012 1        
Liquidity (7) 0.011 -0.058 0.032 -0.020 -0.002 0.133 1       
Syndication (8) -0.092 0.018 0.034 0.020 -0.019 0.119 0.019 1      
IPO (9) 0.020 -0.002 -0.149 0.163 -0.003 -0.250 -0.006 0.022 1     
M&A (10) 0.013 -0.057 -0.033 0.145 -0.008 -0.046 -0.035 -0.039 -0.231 1    
Early (11) -0.033 0.118 -0.050 -0.039 0.018 0.072 -0.039 0.141 -0.088 -0.020 1   
Expansion (12) 0.034 -0.147 0.033 -0.003 -0.004 -0.135 0.059 -0.144 0.053 -0.022 -0.734 1  
Later (13) 0.005 0.014 0.030 0.059 -0.004 0.065 -0.017 -0.023 0.061 0.057 -0.526 -0.192 1 
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Appendix D: Robustness 
This table shows the coefficients of cross-border indicators for different models by regions. The results are reported by the 
baseline Heckman model (1), the three-stage Heckman model (2), the instrumental variable for syndication (3), market conditions 
and busyness (4), and propensity score matching (5). The control variables are as reported in the prior tables. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Model I:  
North America 
Model II:  
Europe (Ex. UK) 
Model III:  
UK 
Model IV:  
ROW 
Coefficient of cross-border 
indicator 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
         
(1) Baseline Heckman model (from 
Table 3) -0.192** (0.033) -0.232** (0.017) -0.270** (0.023) -0.156** (0.017) 
(2) Heckman model with two probit 
stages (for exit decision and for 
cross-border investing) 
-0.196** (0.041) -0.248** (0.028) -0.278** (0.033) -0.166** (0.025) 
(3) Heckman model with 
instrumental variable for 
syndication 
-0.1843** (0.045) -0.2204** (0.019) -0.2592** (0.026) -0.1498** (0.019) 
(4) Heckman model with additional 
stage II variables (market 
conditions, busyness) 
-0.179** (0.044) -0.229** (0.020) -0.254** (0.025) -0.145** (0.018) 
(5) Mixed-effects model with 
propensity score matching -0.119** (0.032) - - - - - - 
